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WHO CAN BEST REGULATE THE ETHICS OF
FEDERAL PROSECUTORS, OR, WHO SHOULD
REGULATE THE REGULATORS?:
RESPONSE TO LITTLE
Fred C. Zacharias*
O N August 4, 1994, U.S. Attorney General Janet Reno adopted a
formal rule governing federal lawyers' "Communications With
Represented Persons" (the "Reno rule" or the "no-contacts rule").'
The regulation asserts a broad power of the Department of Justice
("DOJ") to supplant state ethics regulation of federal prosecutors2
* Herzog Scholar and Professor of Law at the University of San Diego School of
Law.
1. 28 C.F.R. § 77 (1995); see also Communications with Represented Persons, 59
Fed. Reg. 39,910 (1994) (to be codified at 28 C.F.R § 77) (explaining the no-contacts
rule). The Justice Department's claim to an exclusive right to regulate federal prose-
cutors is of recent origin. In 1989, Richard Thornburgh, Attorney General in the
Bush Administration, issued a controversial internal memorandum instructing Justice
Department lawyers to interpret narrowly state ethics provisions that interfere with
criminal investigations. Memorandum from Dick Thornburgh, Attorney General, to
All Justice Department Litigators 1 (June 8, 1989) [hereinafter "Thornburgh Memo-
randum"], reprinted in Matter of Doe, 801 F. Supp. 478, 489 (D.N.M. 1992); see also
Richard L. Thornburgh, Ethics and the Attorney General. The Attorney General Re-
sponds, 74 Judicature 290 (1991) (justifying the Thomburgh Memorandum). The
Memorandum prompted a storm of criticism and litigation. See Neals-Erik W. Delker,
Comment, Ethics and the Federal Prosecutor: The Continuing Conflict over the Appli-
cation of Model Rule 4.2 to Federal Attorneys, 44 Am. U. L Rev. 855, 858-59 nn.16-19
(1995); Amy R. Mashburn, A Clockwork Orange Approach to Legal Ethics: A Con-
flicts Perspective on the Regulation of Lawyers by Federal Courts, 8 Geo. J. Legal
Ethics 473, 479-90 nn.22-64 (1995); Fred C. Zacharias, Specificity in Professional Re-
sponsibility Codes: Theory, Practice, and the Paradigm of Prosecutorial Ethics, 69 No-
tre Dame L. Rev. 223, 255 n.100, 269 n.134 (1993) [hereinafter "Zacharias, Specificity
in Professional Responsibility Codes"]. The Clinton Administration initially proposed
a formal regulation establishing a virtually unlimited right of Justice Department law-
yers to contact unrepresented parties preindictment, in violation of many state profes-
sional codes. See Proposed Justice Department Rule on Communications with
Represented Persons, 58 Fed. Reg. 39,976 (1993) (to be codified at 28 C.F.R. § 77)
(proposed July 26, 1993) (detailing early history of the proposed rule). It subse-
quently withdrew that regulation to allow for a more open comment period. See Pro-
posed Justice Department Rule on Communications with Represented Persons, 59
Fed. Reg. 10,086 (1994) (to be codified 28 C.F.R. § 77) (proposed Mar. 3, 1994) (de-
tailing subsequent history). After the comment period, Attorney General Reno reis-
sued the regulation in its current form.
2. See 28 C.F.R. §§ 77.1-77.2 (1995) (asserting sources and nature of DOJ author-
ity to supplant other professional regulation); Proposed Justice Department Rule on
Communications with Represented Persons, 59 Fed. Reg. 10,086, 10,088 (1994) (to be
codified at 28 C.F.R. § 77) (proposed Mar. 3, 1994) (asserting broad DOJ "authority
to exempt its attorneys from the reach of [local ethics rules]"); Alafair S.R. Burke,
Note, Reconciling Professional Ethics and Prosecutorial Power: The No-Contact Rule
Debate, 46 Stan. L. Rev. 1635, 1650-61 (1994) (arguing that the final Reno rule repre-
sents a "compromise" concerning the exercise of DOJ authority); Mashburn, supra
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and, more specifically, supersedes all professional rules governing
contacts by federal prosecutors with represented persons.'
The Reno rule raises two difficult legal questions. First, may the
DOJ rely on its statutory crime-investigative authority to administra-
tively preempt state ethics codes that encompass federal prosecutors?
4
Second, under the same authority, may the DOJ preempt local federal
district court rules?
Rory Little's contribution to this symposium compiles and strength-
ens the legal arguments supporting the Attorney General's position.5
Lower federal courts have not uniformly accepted these arguments.
Numerous commentators also have taken the position that the Reno
rule exceeds the Attorney General's authority, particularly insofar as
it overrules federal judicial mandates.7 Part I of this Response offers a
note 1, at 494 (noting that "the DOJ's new rule takes the concept of attorney self-
regulation to the most extreme manifestation imaginable.").
3. 28 C.F.R. § 77.12 (1995) (stating that "this part is intended.., to preempt the
entire field of rules concerning such contacts.").
4. In addition to its statutory authority to investigate crimes under U.S.C. Title
28, the DOJ relies on its general authority as an executive agency to adopt regulations
to govern "the conduct of its employees... and [the] performance of its business." 5
U.S.C. § 301 (1994). This general provision of the Administrative Procedures Act
("APA") alone cannot justify the Reno rule. For an agency to adopt a substantive rule
of law under the APA, the adoption must be authorized by Congress. See Chrysler
Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 301-2, 313 (1979). The Supreme Court has held that the
APA itself does not constitute such authorization. Alternatively, if the regulation is
deemed procedural, then it does not have the "force and effect" of preemptive federal
law under the APA. Id.; see also Corinna B. Lain, Prosecutorial Ethics Under the Reno
Rule: Authorized by Law?, 14 Crim. Just. Ethics 17, 22-24 (Summer/Fall 1995) (dis-
cussing the DOJ's regulatory power under the APA).
5. Rory Little, Who Should Regulate the Ethics of Federal Prosecutors?, 65 Ford-
ham L. Rev. 355 (1996).
6. See, e.g., Whitehouse v. United States Dist. Court, 53 F.3d 1349 (1st Cir. 1995)
(upholding federal local court rule applying state ethics provision against federal pros-
ecutors); United States v. Klubock, 832 F.2d 664, 667 (1st Cir. 1987) (en banc) (hold-
ing that the Supremacy Clause does not bar enforcement of local court attorney
discipline rule).
7. See, e.g., Burke, supra note 2, at 1660-61 (arguing that "the regulations intrude
upon the attorney-client relationship in ways unwarranted by the needs of effective
law enforcement); Lain, supra note 4, at 17 (arguing against preemptive DOJ author-
ity); Mashburn, supra note 1, at 495 (arguing that Reno's position lacks support in the
case law or in statutory authority); see also Little, supra note 5, at 362-63 & n.30
(noting "outraged bar officials"); Bruce A. Green, Federal Prosecutors' Ethics: Who
Should Draw the Line, 7 Prof. Law. 1, 7 (Nov. 1995) (questioning the wisdom of the
Reno rule); Jocelyn Lupert, Note, The Department of Justice Rule Governing Commu-
nications with Represented Persons, 46 Syracuse L. Rev. 1119, 1144-45 (1996) (catalog-
ing the hostility to the Reno rule); cf Elizabeth A. Allen, Note, Federalizing the No-
Contact Rule: The Authority of the Attorney General, 33 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 189, 219,
227 (1995) (arguing that the Reno rule is consistent with existing ethics rules); Roger
C. Cramton & Lisa K. Udell, State Ethics Rules and Federal Prosecutors: The Contro-
versies over the Anti-contact and Subpoena Rules, 53 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 291 (1992) (chal-
lenging state bars' authority to regulate federal prosecutors); F. Dennis Saylor, IV &
J. Douglas Wilson, Putting a Square Peg in a Round Hole: The Application of Model
Rule 4.2 to Federal Prosecutors, 53 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 459 (1992) (discussing the applica-
tion of Model Rule 4.2 to federal prosecutors).
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few observations on the legal issues, but will not duplicate the work
that others have done.8
The bulk of this Response, Part I, focuses on a separate question
that Professor Little's article raises. Namely, even if the Attorney
General has the authority she claims, should the Attorney General
preempt state or district court codes?9 Little answers in the nega-
tive.' 0 I am not so convinced. In light of the history of the no-contacts
issue and the related issue of rules governing grand jury subpoenas of
attorneys," I view the Reno rule as a small battle in a larger war be-
tween the ABA and the DOJ for control of ethics governance. Part II
suggests that neither institution is an appropriate decision maker in
the areas over which they are squabbling. The process of DOJ pre-
emption, however, may be the easiest way to encourage the most suit-
able decision maker-Congress-to intervene.
I. THE LEGAL ISSUES
A. DOJ Preemption of State Ethics Regulation
The DOJ relies on two sets of statutory authority for the proposi-
tion that the DOJ may preempt state ethics codes.' 2 First, it relies
upon the general authority of Executive Department heads to "pre-
scribe regulations for the.., conduct of its employees [and the]...
8. This Response was initially prepared as a symposium response to a draft by
Professor Little presented at the American Association of Law Schools 1996 Annual
Meeting in Washington, D.C.. Professor Little has subsequently changed and ex-
panded his paper, partly in response to my symposium submission. To avoid a never-
ending cycle of changes, I have not responded to each new amendment and argument.
I have also tried to avoid contesting every criticism Professor Little has made of my
positions (some of which are well-taken, some less so), lest Little feel the need to
defend himself and thereby reinitiate the cycle.
9. Little, supra note 5, at 358-59. For another recent perspective on the same
issue, see Bruce A. Green, Whose Rules of Professional Conduct Should Govern Law-
yers in Federal Court and How Should the Rules be Created?, 64 Geo. Wash. L Rev.
(forthcoming 1996) (arguing that federal courts can best regulate federal prosecutors)
[hereinafter Green, Whose Rules?].
10. Little, supra note 5, 359.
11. As discussed in greater detail at part II.B infra, the DOJ's decision to claim
authority to preempt state regulation stemmed from the DOJ's reaction to two ABA
provisions that, in effect, limited the investigative power of federal prosecutors-
ABA, Model Rules of Professional Conduct and Code of Judicial Conduct, Rules 4.2
(governing contacts with represented persons) and Rule 3.8(f) (governing grand jury
subpoenas directed to attorneys) [hereinafter Model Rules]. For a full discussion of
the grand jury subpoena issue, see Fred C. Zacharias, A Critical Look at Rules Gov-
erning Grand Jury Subpoenas of Attorneys, 76 Minn. L. Rev. 917 (1992) [hereinafter
Zacharias, Subpoenas of Attorneys].
12. Little suggests the possibility of a third source of authority; namely, the consti-
tutional mandate that the President "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed."
U.S. Const. art. II, § 3. See Little, supra note 5, at 380-81. As Little notes, this is a
novel argument that neither commentators nor courts have considered, much less
adopted. Id. at 380 n.129. Because Little does not develop the argument in his article,
I will not analyze the argument here.
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performance of [the Department's] business."'1 3 Second, it relies gen-
erally upon the attorney general's authority under Title 28 to detect
and prosecute crimes. 4
Although there is significant room for creative legal arguments re-
garding a federal agency's authority to prescribe preemptive regula-
tions, several principles are clear. 5 To the extent an agency has
preemptive authority, that authority derives from Congress. 6 Con-
gress may expressly delegate preemptive authority in a particular area
of law.' 7 When Congress has not done so and the statutory language
is ambiguous with respect to Congress's intent, courts may infer intent
to delegate, but do so reluctantly.' 8
Courts have offered various scenarios in which it is appropriate for
an agency to infer a congressional desire to displace state law; for ex-
ample, when federal legislation in a field is so pervasive as to leave no
other reasonable conclusion' 9 or when "compliance with both federal
13. 5 U.S.C. § 301 (1994).
14. 28 U.S.C. §§ 515, 516, 532-47 (1994).
15. For an excellent summary of the law of preemption and of the arguments
against preemption in the no-contacts area, see Lain, supra note 4 (discussing the
statutory authority and preemptive power over state laws of a DOJ regulation that
exempts federal prosecutors from the no-contacts rule).
16. See Wisconsin Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 604 (1991) (holding
that the ability to preempt state law derives from Congress); Louisiana Pub. Serv.
Comm'n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 369 (1986) (noting that a federal agency may preempt
state regulation if it is acting within the scope of its congressionally delegated author-
ity); Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 301-02 (1979) (holding that an agency's
exercise of preemptive authority must derive from Congress and is subject to limita-
tions imposed by Congress).
17. See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 511 (1992) (discussing force
of express preemption provisions); English v. General Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 78-79
(1990) (listing acts of Congress that explicitly define the extent of preemption).
18. See, e.g., Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Md., 437 U.S. 117, 132 (1978) (noting the
Court's general reluctance to infer preemptive authority); Jones v. Rath Packing Co.,
430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977) ("[W]e start with the assumption that the historic police
powers of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the
clear and manifest purpose of Congress." (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp.,
331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947))).
Although acknowledging these general principles, Professor Little argues for the
existence of a broad rule of deference to agency choices. See Little, supra note 5, at
389 (arguing that "it is difficult to conclude neutrally that an Attorney General's na-
tional regulation of her prosecutor's ethics that is rationally related to the effective and
fair enforcement of federal criminal laws would be invalid if it was in conflict with
state codes" (emphasis added)); id at 397 (arguing case law for the proposition that
"the Attorney General has implied legal authority to act preemptively if she has rea-
sonable cause after due deliberation.., to ensure that federal prosecutors comply
with fair and uniform ethical rules" (emphasis added)). Without entering into further
debate on this legal issue, I should note that my reading of the cases suggests that
Little may be stretching the law.
19. See Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resource Conservation & Dev.
Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 203-04 (1983); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218,
230 (1947).
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and state regulations is a physical impossibility."2 In defending the
DOJ claim, Professor Little relies primarily on the principle that au-
thorization to preempt can be inferrred when state law "stands as an
obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and
objectives of Congress."'" If state ethics provisions frustrate the
"structure and purpose" of the congressional delegation to the DOJ to
investigate and prosecute crime, the argument goes, Congress must
have intended to let the DOJ supersede those provisions. 2
When one unpacks all the rhetoric of the DOJ position, here is the
nub of the issue. What do we mean by frustrating the "structure and
purpose" of the congressional scheme? Corinna Lain has demon-
strated ably that Congress's general grant to all agency heads to "pre-
scribe regulations governing... the conduct of its employees" hardly
rises to the type of specific, substantive federal scheme that provides a
foundation for preemptive authority.23 Little himself acknowledges
that the Attorney General needs to show more than that state ethics
codes "interfere" with some criminal investigation.24 There must be a
broader statutory purpose "the accomplishment and execution" of
which state regulation threatens, and which Congress therefore im-
plicitly authorized the DOJ to protect.
20. Hillsborough County v. Automated Medical Lab., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 713
(1985) (quoting Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43
(1963)); see generally, Marilyn P. Westerfield, Federal Preemption and the FDA: What
Does Congress Want?, 58 U. Cin. L. Rev. 263 (1989) (discussing federal preemption of
state law).
21. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941). See Little, supra note 5, at 383
(citing Hines, 312 U.S. at 67); see also Schneidewind v. ANR Pipeline Co., 485 U.S.
293, 299-300 (1988) (relying on implicit preemption of state law that conflicts with
federal law); Fidelity Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. De La Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153
(1982) (holding that even when Congress has not displaced state law completely, state
law is preempted to the extent that it conflicts with federal law).
22. Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519,525 (1977); Little, supra note 5, at 391
(citing Rath Packing, 430 U.S. at 525).
23. Lain, supra note 4, at 22-23 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 301 (1988)) (illustrating that
the APA provides a foundation for preemptive authority only where there is a sepa-
rate, substantive delegation of statutory authority); see also Mashburn, supra note 1,
at 501 (quoting Dobbs v. Train, 409 F. Supp 432, 436 (N.D. Ga. 1975), affd sub nom.,
Dobbs v. Costle, 559 F.2d 946 (5th Cir. 1977)) (concluding that the housekeeping
statute does not provide preemptive authority where the regulations at issue "do not
comport with congressional intent").
Throughout his article, Professor Little dismisses Corrina Lain's arguments as those
of a "third year law student." See, Little, supra note 5, at 386 n.174. In fairness, I
think Lain's piece is a good one. Her arguments are flawed, if at all, only in their
tendency to overstate in brief-like fashion. On occasion, Little's arguments also suffer
from this failing because Little clearly is attempting to bolster, not just analyze, the
DOJ's legal position-just as Lain was trying to refute it. See e.g., supra note 18, infra
notes 42, 59 and accompanying text (arguing for a broad rule of deference to the
DOJ's choices).
24. See Little, supra note 5, at 392-93.
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Although a full analysis of the preemption issue is beyond the scope
of this piece, 5 it seems to me that the DOJ, and to some extent Little,
may have put the rabbit in the hat. They seem to argue that the sub-
stantive question really is one of procedure. Once the Attorney Gen-
eral promulgates a regulation which substitutes for limited parts of
state codes-following the prescribed mechanism for administrative
rulemaking-then the question of whether the state rules "stand as an
obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the.., objectives of
Congress" somehow disappears.26 I have difficulty understanding why
the issue of whether state law frustrates Congress's objectives should
turn on the mechanism the Attorney General uses to further Con-
gress's objectives.27
Consider this example. If Congress were to exempt federal investi-
gators from obeying state criminal statutes or laws designed to protect
citizens' privacy, Congress's action would simply be tested for its con-
stitutionality. However, if the Attorney General issued a regulation
doing the same, or more specifically authorized agents to use wiretaps,
which are illegal under some state laws, one would have to consider
whether Congress implicitly authorized that preemption.28 Neither
25. Others, including Little and Lain, have already undertaken that task. See, Del-
ker, supra note 1, at 874-881; Mashburn, supra note 1, at 498-513.
26. See 59 Fed. Reg. 39,910, 39,916 (1994) (to be codified at 28 C.F.R. § 77) (em-
phasizing the procedures followed in enacting the Reno rule and the DOJ's intent to
preempt state law); Little, supra note 5, at 392-93 & n.207 (emphasizing the signifi-
cance of procedurally correct rulemaking for the preemption issue, but recognizing
that proponents of the Attorney General's regulatory authority also go too far in
asserting that the "presumption against preemption ... has been clearly overcome by
the regulation's express preemption provision" (quoting Jamie S. Gorelick & Geof-
frey Kleinberg, Justice Department Contacts With Represented Persons: A Sensible So-
lution, 78 Judicature 136, 145 (Nov.-Dec. 1994))).
To support a similar proposition earlier in his article, Little quotes United States v.
Shimer, 367 U.S. 374, 383 (1961), a case in which the Court deferred to an agency in
its accommodation of policy choices that were delegated by Congress. Little, supra
note 5, at 383-84. In Shimer, the Court did not defer on the question of whether the
power was delegated in the first instance. Shimer, 367 U.S. at 381-83. Here, in con-
trast, Congress has delegated power to the DOJ only in the broadest possible sense-
to enforce federal law-and has not given any indication that the DOJ should be able
to preempt state ethics regulation.
27. Professor Little repeatedly draws the distinction between Janet Reno's adop-
tion of a formal regulation and Richard Thomburgh's informal adoption of a preemp-
tive rule for DOJ lawyers. See, Little, supra note 5, at 378 n.116. Little approves
Reno's action, but questions Thornburgh's.
Nevertheless, if a state truly threatened DOJ functions-for example by forbidding
federal investigations in the state-it seems clear that an informal order to DOJ law-
yers to proceed with their investigations would have as much preemptive force as a
formal regulation. In re Neagle, 135 U.S. 1 (1890), one of Little's favorite "venerable
cases," suggests as much. Little, supra note 5, at 393. In Neagle, the actions of a fed-
eral agent operating pursuant to an Attorney General's informal instructions, as op-
posed to a formal regulation, were held to preempt state law. Neagle, 135 U.S. at 58-
68.
28. In contrast, in Neagle, one of the main cases that Little relies on, the Court
specifically found that Congress had granted the Attorney General authority to act
[Vol. 65
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the Attorney General's specificity nor her willingness to follow admin-
istrative procedures displaces the question of whether state law has so
interfered with the DOJ's crime detection "structure" that Congress
would have expected the DOJ to supersede the state statutes. State
law is "inconvenient" for federal law enforcement, but is not necessar-
ily inconsistent with it.
Professor Little seems to recognize the vulnerability of the DOJ po-
sition. He therefore considers both the substance-how state no-con-
tact rules interfere with the DOJ's law enforcement functions-and
judicial principles of construction for deciding congressional intent.
Foremost among these principles is that courts will apply a presump-
tion against inferring congressional intent to preempt state law, 9 par-
ticularly in areas traditionally regulated by the states-such as legal
ethics.3 °
Again, however, the DOJ avoids the core issues. First, the DOJ
suggests that the presumption against preemption applies only to the
question of whether Congress expressed a desire to preempt. Reno
argues that the DOJ's own expression of an intention to preempt re-
solves that issue.3 This begs the question, for courts also have applied
the presumptions in considering whether Congress intended to allow
an administrative agency to do the preempting.3 2 Recognizing as
much, Professor Little acknowledges:
and, therefore, that the statute itself preempted state laws that might interfere with
the Attorney General's actions. Neagle, 135 U.S. at 68; see also infra note 34 (discuss-
ing Neagle).
29. See, eg., CSX Tramp., Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658, 667-68 (1993) (apply-
ing a presumption against interpreting congressional intent to preempt express deci-
sion to preempt); Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 376-79 (1986)
(applying a presumption against implied preemption); Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430
U.S. 519, 525-26 (1977) (discussing policy reasons for presumption against
preemption).
30. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218,230 (1947); cf. Leis v. Flynt, 439
U.S. 438, 442 (1979) ("Since the founding of the Republic, the licensing and regula-
tion of lawyers has been left exclusively to the States... ."); Arons v. New Jersey State
Bd. of Educ., 842 F.2d 58, 63 (3d Cir. 1988) (declining to recognize congressional
intent to limit state's control over practice of law absent express statement to that
effect), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 942 (1988).
31. See Communications with Represented Persons, 58 Fed. Reg. 39,976, 39,981
(1993) (to be codified at 28 C.F.R. § 77) (proposed July 26, 1993) (sidestepping the
argument that Congress has not "chosen to" confer preemptive authority on the
DOJ); see also Burke, supra note 2, at 1652 (assuming, without analysis, that the
"DOJ's intention to preempt state law satisfies any requirement that the federal gov-
ernment display a 'clear and manifest purpose' to preempt state law").
32. See, e.g., Hillsborough County v. Automated Medical Lab., Inc., 471 U.S. 707,
715 (1985) (noting the presumption against preemption when an agency acts without a
clear and manifest purpose by Congress to authorize preemption); Florida Lime &
Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142 (1963) (finding a presumption
against preemption unless the nature of "the regulated subject matter permits no
other conclusion" or Congress has unmistakenly approved preemption); Wabash Val-
ley Power Ass'n, Inc. v. Rural Electrification Admin., 988 F.2d 1480, 1485 (7th Cir.
1993) (holding that, in order to enforce preemptive regulations, an agency must hur-
1996]
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[W]here a federal executive officer states an express intention to
preempt in furtherance of more general statutory authority, the
analysis is one step removed from express congressional preemptive
intent.... Historic state regulation cannot be overcome simply by
federal regulatory assertions of preemption .... [I]t is necessary to
measure the likelihood of implied congressional authorization for
federal regulatory preemption, against the force of the states' his-
toric role of regulation in the area.33
Because this Response does not fully analyze the law of preemp-
tion, it would be quibbling for me to criticize the DOJ's or Little's
standards for evaluating the Reno rule. My point is simply that that
the issues are not as easy as the DOJ would have us believe. More-
over, the two nineteenth century cases Little cites as supplemental
support-In re Neagle34 and Boske v. Comingore2-are unconvinc-
die the "longstanding presumption against preemption of an area traditionally subject
to state regulation").
33. Little, supra note 5, at 387.
34. 135 U.S. 1 (1890). At root, Neagle is a governmental immunities case in which
a specific statute was the source of the federal preemption of state law. The bulk of
the Court's opinion is devoted to the question of whether federal law, even statutory
federal law, can create an immunity from state prosecution.
In Neagle, the Supreme Court concluded that Congress's grants of authority to the
Attorney General necessarily encompassed the power to provide protection for fed-
eral judges outside of court. Id. at 58, 68-69. Thus, it concluded that the Attorney
General was immune from state prosecution for actions taken pursuant to that au-
thority. Id. at 68-69, 74-76. Given the Court's ruling on the substantive federal law,
there was no question that the Attorney General's delegates, the U.S. Marshals, also
had authority to act and be immune from (i.e., preempt) state law under that author-
ity. Id. The function of the regulation upon which Little relies was to identify which
federal agents would exercise the Attorney General's power, not to create any new
substantive preemption of state law.
Professor Little states that he is "at a loss to understand [my] suggestion that Nea-
gle is inapposite because some statute specifically authorized the Attorney General to
act." Little, supra note 5, at 393 n.210. I am equally at a loss to understand Little's
assertions. The Neagle Court explicitly found the power in question as "necessarily
included" by Congress in the Attorney General's enforcement power; in our hypo-
thetical, that intent is the issue. 135 U.S. at 58. Moreover, not satisfied to rest on that
authorization, the Court went on to point to a specific federal statute granting the
power. The Court described that statute in the following terms: "there is positive law
investing the marshals and their deputies with powers which not only justify what
Marshal Neagle did in this matter, but which imposed it upon him as a duty." Id. at 68.
Contrary to Little's claims, the Court thus relied both upon a specific statute as well
as strong indication of a congressional delegation of preemption power.
35. 177 U.S. 459 (1900). Boske focuses on who has the burden of proof in estab-
lishing the validity or invalidity of an allegedly preemptive regulation. The issue was
whether Congress's grant to the Treasury Department of authority to make regula-
tions for "the custody, use and preservation" of tax records encompassed the power
to keep those records secret and protected against state subpoenas. Id. at 467. In
ruling for the government, the Court held that it would defer to the agency interpreta-
tion of the extent of its statutorily granted power unless the challengers could demon-
strate that the interpretation was "inconsistent" with the statute. Id. at 470. In Boske,
however, the Court explicitly assumed that the subject matter was one for which Con-
gress had delegated preemptive authority. That is the very question that needs to be
answered in the no-contacts context. See Little, supra note 5, at 390-91 (arguing that
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ing.36 When all is said and done, Little (to his credit) agrees, noting
that the debate boils down to whether one believes Congress would
countenance federal regulation of federal prosecutors' ethics,37 and to
what extent.38
Are state ethics codes, and in particular the no-contacts provisions,
so inimical to federal law enforcement interests that Congress implic-
itly authorized the DOJ to override them? The DOJ does not, and
probably could not, assert that federal law enforcement is incapable of
proceeding without the ability of prosecutors to contact represented
parties. Rather, the DOJ suggests that the fear of state discipline on
the part of individual federal prosecutors will chill their aggressive-
courts presuming that an agency interpretation of its authority deserves deference
have first required the agency to show a clear congressional intention to delegate with
clarity).
36. Of course, one might dismiss these cases as outdated, for much has happened
in the preemption area since the turn of the century. As discussed above, however,
even if those cases are of continuing vitality, they are not controlling. See supra notes
34-35 and accompanying text.
37. Little, supra note 5, at 391,400-02 (arguing that "[the] doctrine leaves the pre-
emption question as one of congressional intent," but arguing that the burden is on
challengers to the regulation and relying on the absence of evidence that Congress did
not wish to allow preemption in the area of federal prosecutorial ethics).
I would suggest, more accurately, that the question is whether Congress did counte-
nance federal regulation of this nature, rather than whether it would countenance
federal regulation if it addressed the issue today. See City of N.Y. v. FCC, 486 U.S. 57,
64 (1988) (holding proper inquiry to be whether preemptive action is within the
bounds of the delegated authority); Fidelity Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. De La Cuesta,
458 U.S. 141, 154 (1982) (stating that preemptive action depends upon whether the
action is within the scope of delegated authority); Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S.
281, 306-08 (1979) (considering whether Congress "contemplated" the preemptive ac-
tion). Indeed, the only two instances in which Congress has considered the extent of
DOJ authority suggest that, as a factual matter, Congress might not sanction the
DOJ's extreme view of its own authority. First, Congress recently declined to adopt a
proposed statute that would have accorded the DOJ broad rulemaking power. See
infra note 140 and accompanying text Second, a post-Thornburgh Memorandum re-
port by a house committee charged with overseeing DOJ activities expressed disap-
proval of DOJ efforts to preempt local professional regulation. See Subcomm. on
Gov't Information, Justice, Agriculture, House Comm. on Gov't Operations,
Fedederal Prosecutorial Authority in a Changing Legal Environment: More Atten-
tion Required, H.R. Rep. No. 986, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. at 32 (1990) ("We disagree
with the Attorney General's attempts to exempt departmental attorneys from compli-
ance with the ethical requirements adopted by the State bars to which they belong
and in the rules of the Federal Courts before which they appear.").
38. Consider, for example, a DOJ regulation that allowed DOJ personnel to serve
as lawyers without taking or passing the bar. Congress could authorize nonlawyer
prosecutors for federal cases. See Sperry v. Florida ex rel Fla. Bar, 373 U.S. 379, 385
(1963) (holding that federal law governs admission to practice before federal courts
and federal agencies); Theard v. United States, 354 U.S. 278,282 (1957) (holding that
"disbarment by federal courts does not automatically flow from disbarment by state
courts").
The issue in the hypothetical, however, would be whether Congress's delegation to
the DOJ of power to make some regulations for its employees was intended also to
encompass the power to supersede state and federal district court unauthorized prac-
tice of law rules.
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ness, even when contacts might be "authorized by law" (and therefore
within standard exceptions to state ethics prohibitions).39 The need
for uniformity of standards for federal prosecutors, Reno claims, justi-
fies preemption.4 °
Whether these are the type of risks Congress would have consid-
ered an impediment to the execution of the objectives of Congress in
establishing the DOJ is the core issue. Perhaps, as Little suggests,judges will give the DOJ the benefit of the doubt.41 Resolution of that
39. Communications With Represented Persons, 59 Fed. Reg. 39,910, 39,911(1994) (to be codified at 28 C.F.R. § 77); see also Little, supra note 5, at 370-77 (citing
and expanding on DOJ arguments in favor of uniform preemptive federal regulation).
The DOJ has expressed other, less weighty concerns. For example, the DOJ argues
that it is unfair to subject federal prosecutors to the possibility of sanction under vary-
ing state rules and that facing discipline takes a psychological toll on prosecutors. See
59 Fed. Reg. at 39,911 (discussing the effect of disparate rules on federal prosecutors);
Little, supra note 5, at 375-76 (discussing the psychological and financial toll of deal-
ing with bar disciplinary action). Although I am sympathetic to those concerns, the
truth is that the problems caused by disuniformity in state regulation are no more
severe for federal prosecutors than for other lawyers with a national practice. See
Fred C. Zacharias, Federalizing Legal Ethics, 73 Tex. L. Rev. 335, 345-57 (1994) (illus-
trating the Balkanization of professional regulation and noting the difficulties that
Balkanization causes lawyers). Similarly, the psychological impact of confronting dis-
ciplinary processes is the same for all lawyers. Cf. Little, supra note 5, at 371-75 (em-
phasizing the DOJ's "visceral" reaction to the events underlying United States v.
Lopez, 4 F.3d 1455 (9th Cir. 1993), appeals docketed, No. 95-10366 and No. 95-10394
(filed Aug 18, 1995 and Sept. 1, 1995).
Professor Little's oral comments at this symposium suggested that the DOJ also
takes the position that, while disuniformity in professional regulation may chill the
aggressiveness of some federal prosecutors, permissive regulation in individual states
will encourage other federal prosecutors to act too aggressively. Cf. Communications
with Represented Persons, 59 Fed. Reg. 39,910, 39,912 (1994) (to be codified at 28
C.F.R. § 77) (discussing limits imposed by the rule). It seems obvious that the DOJ
could control this danger simply by imposing some limits on prosecutorial contacts
without preempting more stringent state codes.
40. 28 C.F.R. § 77.1(a) (1995); 59 Fed. Reg. at 39,911. Of course, the DOJ's pro-
mulgation of the Reno rule does not mean that federal prosecutors no longer need to
fear state discipline. In the one reported bar action since the Reno rule was adopted,
the Utah State Bar issued an advisory opinion that assumed the Reno rule was inef-
fective in superseding a state ethics provision modelled on Model Rule 4.2. See Utah
State Bar Ethics Advisory Opinion Comm., Op. 95-05 (1996), excerpted in 12 Laws.
Man. on Prof. Conduct 55-56 (ABA/BNA Mar. 6, 1996).
41. Little, supra note 5, at 385 n.165, 400 n.250 (citing Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-44 (1984) (deferring to an
agency's reasonable interpretation of a statute's scope) and Capital Cities Cable, Inc.
v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691, 699-700 (1984) (refusing to second-guess the FCC's decision to
preempt state law where statute granted the agency comprehensive authority to regu-
late cable communication systems)).
The case law seems to leave room for disagreement on the degree of deference
courts should show. Some commentators read the precedents as foreclosing agency
preemption in the absence of a "clear and manifest" authorization by Congress. See,
e.g., Delker, supra note 1, at 878 n.152 (citing Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331
U.S. 218, 230 (1947)); Lain, supra note 4, at 26 n.159 (applying notion that congres-
sional intent must be clear to all aspects of regulatory preemption). Little suggests
that courts must defer to agency determinations once it is clear that Congress has
authorized the agency to carry out federal objectives in the field being regulated. Lit-
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factual question is a project that I must leave to the reader and to the
courts.
4 2
B. DOJ Preemption of Federal District Court Rules
Both the DOJ and Professor Little assume that if the DOJ has the
authority to preempt state law, its regulations also preempt contradic-
tory federal district court rules.43 Success on this claim is important to
the DOJ, because many of the state ethics provisions forbidding con-
tacts with represented persons have been incorporated by reference in
local rules.'
tle, supra note 5, at 399-400. Compare Mississippi Power & Light Co. v. Mississippi ex
reL Moore, 487 U.S. 354, 377-83 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing that courts
should defer to agency interpretations of their own statutory authority) with Miss.
Power & Light Co. v. Miss. ex rel. Moore, 487 U.S. 354, 383-91 (1988) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that no deference is due).
42. Throughout this Response, I have avoided responding to Professor Little argu-
ment-by-argument, because that is unnecessary to my basic points. However, I should
mention in passing that, as a former prosecutor, ittle obviously feels strongly about
some of the DOJ's positions and may assume incorrectly that all readers share his
feelings.
One example is Professor Little's heavy reliance on the facts of United States v.
Lopez, 765 F. Supp. 1433 (N.D. Cal. 1991), vacated and remanded, 4 F.3d 1455 (9th
Cir. 1993), further appeal pending, Nos. 95-10366 & 95-10394 (filed Aug. 18 and Sept
1, 1995), in the appeal of which Little was involved. Little, supra note 5, at 372 n.78.
Little argues that Lopez somehow justifies the DOJ's claim that proper federal law
enforcement requires immunizing DOJ lawyers from state disciplinary rules and dis-
trict court enforcement of local rules. The core of Little's argument is that the district
court in Lopez erroneously found the prosecuting attorney to have committed mis-
conduct and that having to face such judicial "abuse" may cause federal prosecutors
to limit their aggressiveness. See Little, supra note 5, at 371-75. An equally reason-
able reaction to Lopez is that no one can prevent some judges from making crazy
mistakes, the appropriate remedy for which is appellate oversight.
In Lopez, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit corrected the district court's
error. That the federal prosecutor had to deal with the threat of sanction in the in-
terim is distressing, but no more distressing for federal prosecutors than for other
attorneys faced with a judicial or disciplinary threat. Nor does the fact that the Court
of Appeals disagreed with Little on an evidentiary matter-the possibility that the
federal prosecutor actually may have committed some misconduct-prove that judi-
cial oversight of DOJ attorneys is an "obstacle to law enforcement" that requires
DOJ preemption.
43. 28 C.F.R. § 77.12 (1995) (asserting DOJ power to preempt district court rules);
59 Fed. Reg. at 39,917-18 (citing cases for the proposition that federal district court
power to adopt rules for federal prosecutors is extremely limited); Little, supra note 5,
at 405 ("[I]f the Attorney General's authority under § 301 ... to promulgate regula-
tions ... is accepted, then the primacy of such national regulations over 'local' district
court rules follows relatively clearly."). Unlike the DOJ, Little does attempt to justify
this conclusion.
However, he devotes far less space and effort to this endeavor than to supporting
the DOJ's power to preempt state law.
44. According to a recent study commissioned by the Judicial Conference of the
United States, of the 94 federal district courts, 61 have adopted the local state rules of
professional conduct. Memorandum from Daniel Coquillette, Committee on Rules of
Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the U.S., "Local Rules Regulat-
ing Attorney Conduct In the Federal Courts" (July 5, 1995) [hereinafter Judicial Con-
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In part, DOJ's conclusion seems obviously right. If DOJ regula-
tions are federal law, presumably they have the same force as an act of
Congress. I have already taken the position that Congress probably
could adopt a uniform ethics code governing not only the federal
courts, but state bars as well.45
Yet simultaneously, DOJ's conclusion feels wrong. Federal courts
always have exercised power to supervise lawyers appearing before
them.4 6 It seems odd to think that one set of lawyers in federal litiga-
tion-DOJ-could make the courts follow a favorable set of rules.
Moreover, DOJ's claim has significant implications, both for the
courts' inherent power to regulate lawyers47 and for the courts' more
general supervisory authority.4 8 In theory, the Attorney General
ference Report]; see also Linda S. Mullenix, Multiforum Federal Practice: Ethics and
Erie, 9 Geo. J. Leg. Ethics 89, 132-59 (1995) (containing study of professional rules
applicable in each federal district court).
45. Fred C. Zacharias, Federalizing Legal Ethics, 73 Tex. L. Rev. 335 (1994); cf.
Baylson v. Disciplinary Bd., 975 F.2d 102, 112 (3d Cir. 1992) (holding that Fed. R.
Crim. P. 17 superseded and preempted local district court rule limiting grand jury
subpoenas), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 984 (1993).
46. See, e.g., Berger v. Cuyahoga County Bar Ass'n, 983 F.2d 718, 724 (6th Cir.
1993) ("Federal courts have the inherent authority to discipline attorneys practicing
before them and to set standards for their conduct.") (citation omitted); United States
v. Klubock, 832 F.2d 664, 667 (1st Cir. 1987) (en banc) (per curiam) (holding that
courts have inherent and statutory authority to prescribe rules governing lawyers' eth-
ics); cf. United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 46-47 (1992) (acknowledging court's
supervisory power to establish standards for at least in-court prosecutorial conduct);
Michael P. O'Hare, Note, Pennsylvania Uses Separation of Powers to Invalidate Legis-
lation that affects the Legal Profession, 66 Temp. L. Rev. 499, 500 (1993) (noting that
the Pennsylania judiciary has asserted a constitutionally-based inherent power to reg-
ulate the legal profession as a necessary incident to its primary function of deciding
cases); Note, The Inherent Power of the Judiciary to Regulate the Practice of Law-A
Proposed Delineation, 60 Minn. L. Rev. 783, 798 (1976) ("Virtually all courts claim
the inherent judicial power to admit, supervise, and disbar attorneys and generally
regulate the practice of law").
47. The inherent supervisory authority of courts typically has been conceived as a
general power to admit lawyers and to protect the integrity of the judicial process,
which in turn gives rise to the lesser authority to prescribe rules of conduct as a condi-
tion for continued admission. See, e.g., In re Snyder, 472 U.S. 634, 645 n.6 (1985)
(acknowledging power of court to require understanding of and compliance with state
professional regulation as a condition of admission to practice in federal court);
Theard v. United States, 354 U.S. 278, 281 (1957) ("The court's control over a law-
yer's professional life derives from his relation to the responsibilities of a court."); Ex
parte Garland, 71 U.S. 333, 384-85 (1866) (upholding inherent power to suspend or
disbar lawyers); Ex parte Burr, 22 U.S. 529, 530 (1824) (resting supervisory power on
courts' need to maintain decorum and efficiency); In re Evans, 801 F.2d 703, 706 (4th
Cir. 1986) (reaffirming courts' inherent authority to disbar and suspend lawyers);
Cord v. Smith, 338 F.2d 516, 524 (9th Cir. 1964) (noting that federal court's ethics
rules that differ from state rules apply to attorneys appearing before the court).
48. See, e.g., United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 505-06 (1983) (resting limited
supervisory authority, inter alia, on power to preserve the integrity of the judicial
process); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467-79 (1966) (exercising judicial power
to enforce Constitution by imposing prophylactic rule of conduct for police officers);
Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657, 667-68 (1957) (suggesting inherent judicial
power to control court procedures); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914) (ac-
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could rely on the same investigatory authority she relies on for the no-
contacts regulation to authorize other DOJ personnel (e.g., FBI
agents) to violate supervisory judicial mandates.4 9
When one tries to reduce these concerns to legal concepts, there
appear to be two avenues for analysis. We have already noted that the
DOJ promulgates regulations pursuant to the delegation of congres-
sional power. As a separation of powers matter, one might question
whether Congress itself has authority to overrule rules promulgated
by federal courts in their "inherent" authority.50 Second, even if Con-
gress can overrule the courts, did Congress's delegation to the DOJ of
the power to supersede state law include a delegation of power to
overrule the courts?
The DOJ and Professor Little primarily address the first issue.5'
They assert-the DOJ in fairly conclusory fashion, Little in more de-
tail-that the Supreme Court has limited the inherent authority of the
judiciary to supervising "in-court misconduct"51 and that DOJ regula-
tions therefore take precedence over local court rules governing pros-
knowledging courts' inherent power to prevent harm occurring as a result of viola-
tions of constitutional or procedural rules).
49. For example, the asserted DOJ power, in theory, extends to exempting DOJ
officials other than those appearing in court from abiding by judicial gag orders or
following orders to avoid contact with (or even to avoid bribing) jurors in pending
cases.
50. See Mashburn, supra note 1, at 500, 502-03, 525-26 (questioning Congress's
authority to interfere with federal courts' exercise of their inherent authority); Linda
S. Mullenix, Unconstitutional Rulemaking: The Civil Justice Reform Act and Separa-
tion of Powers, 77 Minn. L. Rev. 1283, 1322 (1993) (arguing that Congress has limited
control over the courts' inherent rulemaking power); Cf. Flaksa v. Little River Marine
Constr. Co., 389 F.2d 885, 887 (5th Cir. 1968) (suggesting that courts' inherent power
over the orderly administration of justice goes beyond that which Congress confers).
In light of the constitutional grant of authority to Congress to prescribe federal
jurisdiction, Congress clearly has some power to control the courts. U.S. Const., art.
I. Moreover, Congress has authority under the Commerce Clause to make laws
governing the legal profession. Fred C. Zacharias, Federalizing Legal Ethics, supra
note 45, at 337 n.4. Thus, any argument that courts have inherent authority to super-
vise lawyers free from congressional supervision must have limits. One could reason-
ably construct an argument that there are certain core or essential judicial functions
upon which Congress may not intrude. These functions might be restricted to func-
tions necessary to maintain judicial independence or authority (e.g., the contempt and
bar admission powers) or might be perceived more broadly to include the control of
all aspects of the judicial and lawyering process that are important to the justice
system.
51. Unlike the DOJ, Little at least has addressed the second issue. Yet he largely
seems to assume that the arguments concerning congressional intent and preemption
of state law apply equally to congressional intent and preemption of local district
court rules. See Little, supra note 5, at 404-05.
52. Little, supra note 5, at 408-09 (asserting that broad claims of inherent author-
ity are "suspect" and arguing that the distinction between "in-court versus out-of-
court behavior... [should be] invoked to circumscribe federal supervisory discipli-
nary authority").
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ecutors' out-of-court conduct.5 3 Little also constructs an interesting
new theory that the statutory authority of judges to make court rules is
limited to in-court behavior and is subordinate to the DOJ's concur-
rent statutory authority over DOJ lawyers.54
One has to wonder whether either of these analyses can be right, for
they would mean that local court rules governing prosecutorial con-
tacts are ultra vires whether or not the DOJ promulgates regulations.
Yet conventional wisdom has always been that courts do have some
53. See Communications With Represented Persons, 59 Fed. Reg. 39,910, 39,917
(1994) (to be codified at 28 C.F.R. § 77) (citing United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36
(1992)); Little, supra note 5, at 408-10. Williams, the case the DOJ cites, does focus
on the in-court/out-of-court distinction in limiting judicial supervision in the grand
jury context. Williams, 504 U.S. at 46-47. Even Williams acknowledges, however, that
with respect to out-of-court conduct that may ultimately affect judicial proceedings,
there are limits to outside executive agencies' freedom from judicial supervision. Id.
at 46 (citing Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States, 487 U.S. 250 (1988) (upholding
court's power to dismiss an indictment because of misconduct occurring before the
grand jury)).
Moreover, to the extent that the Williams court recognized the grand jury's inde-
pendence, the Court based its decision on the grand jury's historical independence
from the judicial and executive branches. Williams, 504 U.S.at 49. Williams did not
extinguish a long line of cases in which courts have exercised supervisory authority
over lawyers, federal agents, and their own proceedings. See authorities cited supra
notes 40-41; cf. Williams, 504 U.S. at 50 (holding that the courts' power over the grand
jury is not "remotely comparable to the power they maintain over their own proceed-
ings"). Thus, the proposition that federal courts have no authority over DOJ lawyers
except for conduct that appears in court is far from certain. Cf. Pumphrey v. K.W.
Thompson Tool Co., 62 F.3d 1128, 1131 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that a federal court
may exercise inherent authority over misconduct by lawyer that has affected federal
proceedings even though that lawyer has not entered an appearance in federal court).
54. Little, supra note 5, at 405-10. Little bases his theory on the words in the
Rules Enabling Act which limit courts to prescribing rules for the conduct of "their
business." Id. Little interprets the words "their business" narrowly, as not encom-
passing all conduct of lawyers registered to practice before the court.
I do not respond to Little's new theory here because Little only sketches the argu-
ment and, by itself, it does not change my tentative conclusion that the law is unset-
tled. I instinctively question the theory as an intuitive and historical matter. Courts
long have exercised supervisory authority and the dividing line between in-court and
out-of-court behavior may be unworkable when applied to matters, or actors, that
may someday reach court. Still, the legal question Little identifies deserves more at-
tention than I give it. Perhaps Professor Little will see fit to expand on his ideas in a
separate piece.
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core authority to regulate lawyers55 Little even concedes the exist-
ence of such authority.5 6
Moreover, to the extent that the power to regulate lawyers goes to
the heart of the judicial process, courts may have some power to resist
congressional or executive actions that undercut the integrity of the
process. 7 Congress, for example, might not be able to withdraw
judges' power to cite lawyers and litigants for contempt, because that
would leave the courts defenseless against those who would under-
mine the courts' mandates. 8 It is beyond the scope of this Response
55. See supra note 7; see also Chambers v. Nasco, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 54-55 & n.17
(1991) (holding that courts have inherent power to sanction not only lawyers' in-court
conduct, but also conduct that occurs in connection with trial court proceedings).
It may be that, at root, the DOJ and Little do not believe in that authority. Little
cites Rodgers v. U.S. Steel Corp., 508 F.2d 152 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 832
(1975), the one case that seems to reject such authority. Id. at 163 (holding that
courts' rulemaking authority does not give them authority to regulate the practice of
law). Rodgers, however, is inconsistent with later cases in Rodgers' own circuit which
recognize the authority. United States v. Klubock, 832 F.2d 664, 667 (1st Cir. 1987)
(en banc). Little also cites Justice Scalia's dissenting opinion in Chambers, 501 U.S. at
60 (Scalia, J., dissenting), despite the fact that the majority upheld a district court's
power to sanction a lawyer who had not entered an appearance before the court. See
Little, supra note 5, at 406-09.
56. Little, supra note 5, at 409 (accepting "some [judicial] rule-making authority
over federal prosecutors' ethics"). Little's concession is grudging, for he notes that
courts' "invocations [of inherent authority] are generally revealingly devoid of spe-
cific citational support." Id at 408. A few recent decisions have called into question
the extent, and perhaps even the existence of, inherent judicial power. See, e.g., Mal-
lard v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 490 U.S. 296, 310 (1989) (reserving the issue of whether courts
possess inherent authority to require lawyers to accept court assignments); see also
Sara Sun Beale, Reconsidering Supervisory Power in Criminal Cases: Constitutional
and Statutory Limits on the Authority of the Federal Courts, 84 Colum. L Rev. 1433,
1520-22 (1984) (arguing for the existence of limits on courts' inherent supervisory
authority).
57. See, eg., Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32 (1991) (suggesting that local
rules adopted pursuant to Rules Enabling Act do not displace federal courts' sepa-
rate, inherent authority to sanction lawyers); cf United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. 128,
144-48 (1871) (acknowledging congressional power to limit federal jurisdiction, but
suggesting that there are some limits to that power); A. Leo Levin & Anthony G.
Amsterdam, Legislative Control Over Judicial Rulemaking: A Problem in Constitu-
tional Revision, 107 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1, 30 (1958) (suggesting that even where state
constitutions do not grant the state judiciary rulemaking power, the judical branches
consistently have claimed absolute command of those spheres of activity that are fun-
damental and necessary for courts); Jack B. Weinstein, Reform of Federal Court
Rulemaking Procedures, 76 Colum. L. Rev. 905, 906 (1976) (noting courts' inherent
rulemaking power that derives in part from courts' role as a constitutional independ-
ent judiciary).
58. See Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517, 539 (1925) ("The power of contempt
which a judge must have and exercise in protecting the due and orderly administra-
tion of justice and in maintaining the authority and dignity of the court is most impor-
tant and indispensable."); Zambrano v. City of Tustin, 885 F.2d 1473, 1478 (9th Cir.
1989) (describing courts' inherent power to sanction lawyers as flowing "from the
very nature of a court, from strict functional necessity" (citing Michaelson v. United
States, 266 U.S. 42, 66 (1924))); cf. Mashburn, supra note 1, at 529-30 ("Surely, the
federal courts must retain some control over attorney misconduct that indisputably
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to identify the dividing line between core, unregulable judicial powers
and judicial powers subject to Congress's will. My point here is simply
that the DOJ and Little have assumed the answer to what might be a
difficult question.
Even more problematic is the DOJ's dismissal of the question of
whether Congress intended to delegate power to supersede district
court rules.59 I have already noted that congressional intent is key to
the preemption issue.6° To the extent courts would give the DOJ and
other federal agencies the benefit of the doubt regarding preemption
of state law, that probably is because courts recognize that Congress
has established the federal agencies but has not had input into state
law. Arguably, courts are relying on a background assumption that
Congress has an interest in preserving the federal structure against
interference by the state.
The same background assumption does not hold true with respect
to federal district court rules. First, such local rules are authorized by
federal statute.61 Absent an express statement to the contrary, there
affects the courts' proceedings or jeopardizes the courts' ability to enforce their
orders.").
59. Professor Little does acknowledge that the question of whether the DOJ may
preempt local district court rules "boils down to" whether congressional statutes have
authorized such preemptive regulations. Little, supra note 5, at 404; see also Judicial
Conference Report, supra note 44, at 31 ("[W]ith proper authority, through an Act of
Congress, federal agencies could pass valid regulations which supersede local rules
governing attorney conduct.") (emphasis added). However, Little's arguments for
finding such an authorization are mostly conclusory.
Little first argues that "the Attorney General's authority under § 301 and Title 28
to promulgate regulations in this area is accepted, then the primacy of such national
regulations over 'local' district court rules follows relatively clearly." Little, supra note
5, at 405. This sidesteps the possibility that Congress may have had a different view of
preemption of judicial rules than it has for preemption of state law.
Little next argues that DOJ regulations trump because they are "national" in na-
ture ("as well as Federal Register noticed and approved") while district court rules are
"local." Id. at 406. It is unclear how and why this semantic distinction should deter-
mine Congress's wishes about which rule should govern.
Third, Little asserts that when local rules conflict with an agency rule, "a reasonable
interpretation of § 2071 is that duly promulgated regulations having the status of fed-
eral law should override any conflicting 'local' federal rules" and that allowing federal
districts to exempt themselves would create a "patchwork vision [that] seems inconsis-
tent with a federal regulatory system." Id. at 407-08. Again, Little assumes the con-
gressional intent.
As discussed below, Little does make some interesting constitutional and statutory
arguments about the extent of inherent judicial power and judicial authority under
the Rules Enabling Act. These new theories ultimately may help the DOJ's position.
For my purposes, however, it suffices to conclude that the issue of DOJ preemption of
local rules, at present, remains murky and unresolved. See supra notes 31-33, and
accompanying text.
60. See supra notes 27-34 and accompanying text.
61. 28 U.S.C. § 2071 provides in pertinent part: "The Supreme Court and all
courts established by Act of Congress may from time to time prescribe rules for the
conduct of their business. Such rules shall be consistent with Acts of Congress and
rules of practice and procedure prescribed under section 2072 of this title." 28 U.S.C.
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is little reason to assume that Congress would want to give the Execu-
tive's regulations priority over the courts.62 Second, as a separation of
powers matter, Congress should be presumed to respect judicial inde-
pendence from regulation by other branches. Although this indepen-
dence may have limits, its existence suggests that Congress would not
intend to curtail it through a general grant of authority to individual
agencies or-as the DOJ asserts-through the even more general
grant to all agencies of rulemaking power. 63 Again, there is more to
the issue than the Reno rule's proponents acknowledge.
C. Conclusion
The DOJ ultimately may prevail on both preemption issues. But
the pertinent decisions that the courts have issued thus far illustrate
that achieving a judicial resolution will be a slow, tortuous process.6
The above analysis suggests that a DOJ victory is by no means certain.
§ 2701 (1994). In addition, Rule 57 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
provides:
Each district court acting by a majority of its district judges may ... make
and amend rules governing its practice. A local rule shall be consistent with
- but not duplicative of - Acts of Congress and rules adopted under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2072.... In all cases not provided for by rule, a judge may regulate prac-
tice in any manner consistent with federal law, these rules, and local rules of
the district.
Fed. R. Crim. P. 57.
62. See Mashburn, supra note 1, at 500, 503 (rejecting DOJ argument that the
DOJ rule trumps district court rule made pursuant to at least equivalent statutory
authority).
Little resolves this issue by concluding: "When valid rules of national application,
duly promulgated pursuant to the APA, conflict with 'local' rules not so promulgated,
ought not the latter give way?" Little, supra note 5, at 406. Little, again equating the
DOJ's rulemaking with an act of Congress, also argues that the federal regulatory
system envisions that regulations "having the status of federal law should override
any conflicting 'local' federal court rules." Id at 407. The argument sidesteps the
essential question of what authority Congress intended to delegate to the DOJ.
63. See 28 C.F.R. § 77.1(b) (1995) (relying inter alia, on 5 U.S.C. § 301's general
grant of authority agencies to prescribe regulations for the conduct of their employees
and the performance of their business).
64. Courts that have addressed the preemption issues in the context of the
prosecutorial subpoena and no-contacts rules have reached a variety of conclusions.
See e.g., United States v. Ferrara, 54 F.3d 825 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (avoiding preemption
issues by finding lack of personal jurisdiction over the lawyer in question);
Whitehouse v. United States Dist. Court, 53 F.3d 1349 (1st Cir. 1995) (upholding fed-
eral district court's adoption of state anti-subpoena rule with respect to trial subpoe-
nas but not grand jury subpoenas); United States v. Lopez, 4 F.3d 1455, 1461 (9th Cir.
1993) (requiring prosecutorial compliance with California no-contacts rule), appeals
docketed, No. 95-10366 and No. 95-10394 (filed Aug 18, 1995 and Sept. 1, 1995); Bayl-
son v. Disciplinary Bd., 975 F.2d 102, 105 (3d Cir. 1992) (rejecting district court's
authority to adopt state rule limiting grand jury subpoenas), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 984
(1993); Kolibash v. Committee on Legal Ethics, 872 F.2d 571, 575 (4th Cir. 1989)
(noting that the Supremacy Clause may bar state enforcement against federal prose-
cutors of state's anti-subpoena rule); United States v. Hammad, 858 F.2d 834, 839 (2d
Cir. 1988) (holding that local rule's "authorized by law" exception to no-contacts was
satisfied by the federal government's legal authority to investigate crimes), modified
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Professor Little, although more certain than I of the legal ground on
which the DOJ stands, suggests that continuing the fight through ex-
pansive use of the DOJ's claimed authority would result in a phyrric
victory.65 He urges DOJ restraint.
Part II of this Response considers Little's view on its own terms.
Assuming Little is correct in his legal analysis and that the DOJ tech-
nically has power to preempt state and local ethics codes, should it
exercise that power? Little answers in the negative, arguing that a
scheme of DOJ preemption is too costly for the DOJ in terms of re-
sources,66 damage to the DOJ's prestige,67 and damage to the DOJ's
relationships with the states and the private bar.68 Little also argues
that a preemptive rule may, ultimately, lead to a poor substantive re-
gime resulting from biased enforcement 69 and may have a negative
effect on DOJ personnel.70 The following pages will suggest that on
the normative question of whether the DOJ should preempt, too,
there may be more to the issue than Professor Little's DOJ-centered
cost-benefit analysis acknowledges.7'
II. SHOULD THE DOJ PREEMPT STATE OR DISTRICT
COURT RULES?
For me, whether the DOJ should issue preemptive ethics provisions
is, in part, a public choice issue.72 Thus far, we have seen three sets of
on other grounds, 902 F.2d 1062 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 871 (1990); United
States v. Klubock, 832 F.2d 664, 667 (1st Cir. 1987) (en banc) (upholding federal dis-
trict court's power to adopt local rule governing federal prosecutors' grand jury sub-
poenas); In re Doe, 801 F. Supp. 478, 485 (D.N.M. 1992) (rejecting Supremacy Clause
argument).
65. See Little, supra note 5, at 417-23 (arguing that the costs of imposing a pre-
emptive rule outweigh the benefits).
66. See id. at 418-19 (discussing burden that a federal enforcement system would
impose on the DOJ's resources and the Attorney General's time).
67. See id. at 419-20 (discussing damage to prestige and arguing that it would man-
ifest itself in expensive legal challenges).
68. See id. at 419-21 (arguing that preemption constitutes an "arrogant federal in-
cursion on historic state and local authority" that may breed reciprocation).
69. See id. at 422 (discussing negative substantive effects of rules promulgated and
enforced by the DOJ).
70. Although most of Little's predicted costs are plausible, the argument that a
preemptive system will encourage DOJ lawyers to become career prosecutors seems
somewhat far-fetched. Little suggests that prosecutors who follow the DOJ rule
somehow will lose prestige or become pariahs in states whose rules differ, and thus
will be unwelcome, or even be excluded, as private practitioners in those states. Id. at
422-23. The preemptive scheme in question covers so small a portion of the federal
prosecutor's practice that it is difficult to imagine this reaction. Admittedly, however,
the probabilities of Little's scenario is an empirical matter about which Little, as a
former federal prosecutor, may have better information than I.
71. By "DOJ-centered," I simply mean to suggest that Little analyzes the DOJ's
policy largely on its own terms, based on the costs and benefits of the policy to the
DOJ's own interests.
72. To purists, "public choice" analysis refers to the application of "economics to
the study of political processes." Geoffrey Brennan & James M. Buchanan, Is Public
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rulemakers address prosecutorial ethics: the ABA, the DOJ, and the
courts. Given their membership, we can most usefully conceive of the
ABA and the DOJ as the sets of lawyers on the opposite side of fed-
eral litigation (or a significant part of federal litigation)73 with the fed-
eral courts acting as the arbiters of that litigation. In resolving Little's
normative issue, we should ask ourselves three very practical ques-
tions: (1) Should either side of the litigation be making the rules? (2)
If not, who should? and (3) How do we get there? The following sec-
tion considers these questions by analyzing each of the potential
rulemakers in turn.
A. Who Should Control Regulation of Federal Prosecutors?
1. What Rulemakers Need to Decide
Professor Little considers the broad substantive issue of "who
should decide" the substance of prosecutorial ethics regulation by
looking at the side effects of DOJ regulation-in particular, the side
effects on the DOJ itself.74 His analysis focuses on the substance of
proposed rules, including their normative correctness and the conse-
quences for the DOJ of who decides the substantive issues.75
Because this symposium takes David Wilkins's 1992 article76 as a
starting point, it is worth distinguishing Wilkins's approach from Lit-
tle's. Wilkins's framework takes some definition of "misconduct"-
Choice Immoral? The Case for the "Nobel" Lie, 74 Va. L Rev. 179, 179 (1988); see
also Dennis Mueler, Public Choice II 1 (1989) (characterizing public choice as the
"application of economics to political science"). As Abner Mikva and others have
pointed out, however, public decisionmaking is a complex process that is driven by
self-interest only as one of many factors. Abner J. Mkva, Foreword, 74 Va. L Rev.
167, 167 (1988) (expressing frustration with pure public choice analysis); see also
Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Law and Public Choice 6-7 (1991) (discussing
the multiple strands of the public choice literature). In likening the issues discussed in
this paper to a "public choice" question, I mean only to highlight the importance of
considering the incentives and outlooks of the alternative decisionmakers.
73. In conversations with Professor Little, he has suggested that his position is
based, at least in part, on the hope that DOJ lawyers will become more involved in
ABA business and that ABA rulemakers will become more representative in the for-
mulation of rules. I share the hope, but doubt that it can become reality. Geoffrey
Hazard and Ted Schneyer have documented the increasing politicization of the ABA
rulemaking process-a politicization that, once begun, is unlikely to disappear simply
because some wish for more genteel times. See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., The Future of
Legal Ethics, 100 Yale L.J. 1239 (1991); Ted Schneyer, Professionalism as Bar Politics:
The Making of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 14 L & Soc. Inquiry 677
(1989).
74. See Little, supra note 5, at 418-23.
75. As Little explains, the Reno rule is driven by substantive concern about
nonuniform rules and about particular state rules that hamper law enforcement. See
Little, supra note 5, at 413-14. Little accepts that posture, id. at 369-75, and then
considers countervailing institutional costs to the DOJ of imposing its substantive
choices. Id at 418-23.
76. David B. Wilkins, Who Should Regulate Lawyers?, 105 Harv. L. Rev. 799
(1992).
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for example, lawyers may not talk to represented parties-as a
given." Wilkins would have us focus on who, if anyone, should en-
force prohibitions against that misconduct.78 He suggests that resolu-
tion of the enforcement question should vary with the context. 9 That
analytic framework addresses Little's substantive question-who
should decide what constitutes wrongful prosecutorial conduct-only
indirectly.
There is, however, an overlap. The theory that would give the DOJ
power to decide the substance of ethics rules simultaneously would
give the Attorney General power to decide how and when ethics
prohibitions should be enforced.80 That approach is fundamentally in-
consistent with Wilkins's view that enforcement questions should be
analyzed contextually.
In a piece I wrote several years ago, I argued that Wilkins's process
issue (i.e., who should enforce prohibitions against misconduct) and
the substantive issue (i.e., what should the rules say) are linked.81 I
suggested that professional regulation has a variety of functions. 82
The value which regulators place on each of those functions inevitably
affects the substance of the rules.83 Rulemakers, both in deciding on
the nature of professional codes as a whole and in formulating narrow
provisions, need to consider the array of purposes the regulation is
designed to further and assign weights to them. That process, in turn,
will help determine the substance of each rule.
Professor Little asks, "who should regulate?" prosecutorial ethics.
My response requires me to take my previous position one step fur-
ther. A proper analysis of, say, the no-contacts debate should con-
sider which potential rulemaker is in the best position to decide which
regulatory functions deserve emphasis. In other words, among the
77. See id. at 804.
78. Id. at 805-09
79. Id. at 814-18.
80. See 28 C.F.R. § 77.11 (1995) ("The Attorney General shall have exclusive au-
thority over ... any violations of these rules."). Little recognizes this reality, but parts
with the DOJ's handling of the enforcement issue. He suggests that the DOJ promul-
gate, or participate in the promulgation of a uniform rule, but then allow states to
enforce it. Little, supra note 5, at 414-15. It is unclear that such a scheme would be
constitutional-particularly if, as Little suggests, the reason for implementing the
scheme is to shift the cost of enforcement from the federal government to the states.
See authorities cited in Zacharias, Federalizing Legal Ethics, supra note 45, at 397
n.282.
81. Zacharias, Specificity in Professional Responsibility Codes, supra note 1 at 249-
285.
82. These functions include, among others, guiding lawyer behavior, promoting
introspection, punishing misconduct, defining fraternal norms that facilitate the legal
process, influencing substantive law, and enhancing the image of the bar. Id. at 225-
39.
83. See id. at 249-85 (describing the correlation between code drafting and the
different regulatory functions).
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ABA, the DOJ, courts, Congress, and state legislatures, who should
we trust to assign weights and to make the rules?
Fully analyzing those issues is beyond the scope of this brief com-
ment on Little's article. However, the following pages offer a few ob-
servations, using the context of the Reno rule. It is my hope that this
limited, first stab at considering the issues will help clarify and further
the debate.
2. The DOJ and the ABA as Rulemakers
If the issue is the "trustworthiness" of the potential regulators of
prosecutorial ethics, the ABA and the DOJ immediately seem sus-
pect. Each institution consists largely of one side in the regulated liti-
gation,' so each is likely to allow institutional or membership
interests to dominate its substantive value choices.
Consider, for example, the no-contacts issue. The Reno rule
prescribes a certain balance between defendants' rights to communi-
cate through counsel and federal law enforcement interests in using
undercover agents. Even if we assume that the DOJ's substantive bal-
ance is appropriate, or correct, we nevertheless must recognize that
the DOJ's regulation includes many other (perhaps questionable)
choices regarding the weight to be given the different regulatory goals.
For example, in some circumstances, the Reno rule leaves intact
prohibitions against contacts with represented parties.s Let us take
the DOJ at its word and assume that it truly believes such contacts
would constitute misconduct. Under the Reno rule, those prohibi-
tions are to be enforced internally, through the DOJ administrative
procedures previously applicable to other prosecutorial behavior." In
those other contexts, the procedures have often been misused, or even
84. Federal prosecutors may be members of the ABA. The DOJ's leaders may, in
fact, be prominent enough to demand a platform before the house of delegates. When
push comes to shove, however, the defense bar has far more members, is a more
influential political lobby, and does not hesitate to promote the interests of criminal
defendants and the trial bar. See, eg., Ted Schneyer, Professionalism as Bar Politics:
The Making of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 14 L. & Soc. Inquiry 677,
688-724 (1989) (describing the influence of ATLA and other trial lawyer associations
in the promulgation of the Model Rules) [hereinafter Schneyer, Professionalism]. At
least in recent years, the DOJ has responded in kind. Se4 eg., Green, Whose Rules?,
supra note 9 (discussing the problem of subjectivity in DOJ rulemaking); Nancy J.
Moore, Intra-Professional Warfare Benveen Prosecutors and Defense Attorneys: A
Plea for an End to the Current Hostilities, 53 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 515 (1992) (focusing on
the open warfare between the DOJ and the defense bar in rulemaking matters); cf.
Cramton & Udell, supra note 7, at 293 (describing the clash between federal prosecu-
tors and the defense bar); Mashburn, supra note 1, at 487-88 (describing the conflict
between the DOJ and the defense bar); Zacharias, Subpoenas of Attorneys, supra
note 11, at 951-54 (noting selfish interests of both sides).
85. See, e.g., 28 C.F.R. §§ 77.5, 77.8-10 (1995) (describing prohibited contacts).
86. 28 C.F.R. § 77.11.
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ignored.87 By reimplementing those procedures, the DOJ implicitly
has chosen to emphasize the regulatory goal of providing guidance to
DOJ lawyers over the goal of disciplining misconduct.88
At the same time, the decision to permit some contacts with repre-
sented parties downplays the regulatory function of enhancing com-
munications between DOJ lawyers and the defense bar. 9 In the
preindictment stages, for example, the rule allows DOJ lawyers to cir-
cumvent defense counsel altogether.90
Both the ABA and DOJ regulations attempt to influence the sub-
stantive law-for example, on what contacts are legal-in ways that
are consistent with their memberships' visions of appropriate attor-
ney-client relationships. The Reno rule's basic decision to preempt all
other state and judicial rulemaking represents an extreme approach to
87. See, e.g., Harvey Berkman, GAO: DOJ Ethics Probers Lax, Nat'l L.J., Apr.
17, 1995, at A16 (reporting a GAO report critical of the DOJ's handling of complaints
against prosecutors); Bruce A. Green, Policing Federal Prosecutors: Do Too Many
Regulators Produce Too Little Enforcement?, 8 St. Thomas L. Rev. 69, 84-87 (1995)
(discussing alleged shortcomings of DOJ internal disciplinary machinery); Lain, supra
note 4, at 19 (criticizing the history of DOJ enforcement of internal regulations); Lyn
M. Morton, Seeking the Elusive Remedy for Prosecutorial Misconduct: Suppression,
Dismissal, or Discipline?, 7 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 1083, 1104-07, 1109-1113 (detailing
and questioning viability of DOJ internal disciplining mechanisms).
88. Attorney General Reno has stated that "[t]he Department intends to fully en-
force" the Reno rule, but that promise is not binding. 59 Fed. Reg. 39,910, 39,918(1994) (to be codified at 28 C.F.R. § 77). Moreover, even assuming Reno's good
faith, one might reasonably expect the DOJ to revert to its historical tendencies once
Reno leaves the department. Cf. Little, supra note 5, at 377 n.110 ("There is abso-
lutely no evidence that Attorney General Reno will not enforce her promise on the
no-contacts regulations; any suggestion to the contrary is unsupported cynicism flow-
ing from a prior time when there was no regulation and the Department's internal
disciplinary office was relatively new."); Allen, supra note 7, at 221 (arguing that "the
DOJ and independent state bar associations [are] equally effective, or ineffective, as
the case may be, at regulating the conduct of their respective attorneys").
Little suggests that, because states rarely, if ever, have enforced their no-contacts
rules against federal prosecutors, the Reno rule is likely to result in more enforce-
ment. Little, supra note 5, at 418. As Little acknowledges, however, the main effect
of the state rules may have been in ensuring compliance through the threat of disci-
pline-in Little's terms, the "chilling effect". Id. To the extent the DOJ preempts
state rules and DOJ lawyers expect the DOJ to continue in its tradition of nonen-
forcement, the advisory or guiding impact of the state rules may disappear.
89. One of the functions of professional regulation is to establish norms through
which adversarial lawyers can predict and rely on certain conduct by the other side
and therefore can gauge when to trust the adversary and when to engage in aggressive
adversarial behavior. See, e.g., Zacharias, Specificity in Professional Responsibility
Codes, supra note 1, at 266 (discussing ways that professional codes facilitate commu-
nication between adversaries).
90. 28 C.F.R. § 77.7 (1995). Under Model Rule 4.2, contacts are not forbidden
altogether. Prosecutors, however, must allow the contacted person's lawyer to moni-
tor contacts, thus assuring that the lawyer will be involved in the client's decision of
whether to speak. Model Rules, supra note 11, Rule 4.2 (1996). Defense attorneys
can forbid contacts by witholding consent, but prosecutors can mitigate that possibil-
ity through incentives; for example, by witholding information counsel would wish to
hear (e.g., a plea offer) unless the client is present. Under the Reno rule, lawyers can
not know when, if ever, prosecutors will include them in the loop.
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the traditional regulatory function of influencing substantive law.9
Unlike with most professional regulations, the rulemaker here has not
envisioned further development of judicial and legislative standards
over time. Right or wrong, the rule does not purport to affect the
substantive law's development but rather supplants it-in effect, clos-
ing the "laboratory" of the states. 2 That decision implicitly an-
nounces that new approaches will neither be forthcoming, nor worth
considering, in the future.93
Finally, any regulation by the DOJ makes choices regarding the
"public image" function of professional regulation-as would any
counterformulation by the ABA. 4 The DOJ has its own set of con-
cerns regarding citizens' view of law enforcement, in general, and of
the DOJ's performance, in particular.95 The ABA traditionally has
emphasized the importance of safeguarding the relationship between
criminal defendants and counsel, for both systemic reasons and to pro-
tect the financial interests of the bar.96 Inevitably, rules promulgated
by either institution are likely to assign higher weights to the institu-
91. See Zacharias, Specificity in Professional Responsibility Codes, supra note 1, at
274-78 (describing the regulatory function of influencing substantive standards).
92. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting) (describing states as laboratories); cf. Zacharias. Federalizing Legal Ethics,
supra note 45, at 373-75 (questioning the role of states as laboratories in the profes-
sional regulation realm).
93. Little's criticism of the DOJ relies, in part, on his concerns regarding the reac-
tions this approach may engender. See Little, supra note 5, at 419-21 (discussing po-
tential reactions by state courts, the private bar, and Congress).
94. As discussed in Zacharias, Specificity in Professional Responsibility Codes,
supra note 1, at 279-83, there are many potential goals of professional regulation that
might include the category of enhancing the bar's image. These range from making
lawyers seem more trustworthy (so clients will use lawyers better) to making lawyers
seem more deserving of high fees. Often, as in the case of prosecutorial ethics regula-
tion, code drafting prompts a public image war among segments of the bar, with each
group seeking to tarnish the other to make themselves look better or to obtain rules
favorable to personal interests. See id. at 255-56 n.100; see also id. at 289-91 nn204-16
(describing personalized characterizations and hidden agendas of proponents and op-
ponents of Model Rule 3.8(f)).
95. In promulgating the Reno rule, for example, the DOJ focused almost exclu-
sively on the need for prosecutors to be actively involved in all aspects of law enforce-
ment, without fear of ethical limits on their conduct. See Communications With
Represented Persons, 59 Fed. Reg. 10,086, 10,087 (1994) (to be codified at 28 C.F.R.
§ 77) (proposed Mar. 3, 1994) (discussing "salutary development" of prosecutorial
involvement in preindictment activities).
96. This emphasis appears in a variety of contexts, ranging from attorney-client
confidentiality, to rules encouraging zeal, to limits on prosecutorial interference with
defendants' relationship with counsel. Se4 eg., Susan P. Koniak, The Law Between
the Bar and the State, 70 N.C. L. Rev. 1389, 1395-98 (1992) (discussing the vision of
the bar that underlies professional regulation); Fred C. Zacharias, Rethinking Confi-
dentiality, 74 Iowa L. Rev. 351, 358-61 (1989) (discussing justifications for strict confi-
dentiality rules); Zacharias, Subpoenas of Attorneys, supra note 11, at 926-27
(discussing the bar's confidentiality concerns in the context of Model Rule 3.8(f)) and
authorities cited therein.
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tion's personal concerns even if, viewed neutrally, that emphasis may
not be in society's best interests.
3. Federal Courts as Rulemakers
If we cannot trust the DOJ or the ABA to make appropriate selec-
tions among the different possible regulatory goals, should we leave
prosecutorial ethics issues to the federal courts? Presumably, the fed-
eral judiciary is neutral as between prosecution and defense interests
and has some interest in safeguarding federal interests from improper
encroachment by state rulemakers. Arguably, trusting lower federal
courts to make the rules would alleviate concerns over the regulator's
self-interested vision.97
Unfortunately, federal district courts formulating local rules also
are prone to misperceiving the different goals of professional regula-
tion. Because federal district court judges, like the DOJ and the de-
fense bar, are involved in the litigation to be regulated, they too are
naturally inclined to emphasize their own institutional interests in
rulemaking.
For example, district courts tend to tie ethics prohibitions to consti-
tutional baselines, as with the no-contacts rule in United States v.
Hammad.98 They do so in the ethics context because constitutional
considerations are virtually the only aspect of a local rule that can lead
to appellate reversals.
Moreover, psychologically, courts often are driven by jurispruden-
tial theories, public pressures, and personal inclination to recognize
97. See generally Green, Whose Rules?, supra note 9 (advocating greater reliance
on federal courts in identifying appropriate prosecutorial conduct).
98. 858 F.2d 834 (2d Cir. 1988), modified, 902 F.2d 1062 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 498
U.S. 871 (1990). In Hammad, for example, the court first analyzed the no-contacts
issues in terms of the constitutional right to counsel once an indictment is issued. Id.
at 838-39. Yet such constitutional requirements or guarantees do not necessarily de-
fine what lawyers should do in a professional or "ethical" legal system.
Similarly, when local courts adopt rules limiting lawyers' speech to the press, they
tend to think in terms of mandatory rules and the First Amendment limits the
Supreme Court has imposed on such rules. See Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 501
U.S. 1030, 1075 (1991) (reviewing the Supreme Court cases regarding gag rules and
establishing that gag rules are permissible when lawyer speech poses a "substantial
likelihood of material prejudice" to a fair trial); Bailey v. Systems Innovations, Inc.,
852 F.2d 93, 99-01 (3d Cir. 1988) (reviewing challenge to district court rule prohibiting
statements to the press); United States v. Cutler, 815 F. Supp. 599, 609 (E.D.N.Y.
1993) (discussing mandatory local rule limiting lawyer speech). A professional code
drafter, in contrast, might be less concerned with developing enforceable rules than
with providing standards that guide lawyers on what they should or should not do.
Such standards, if not enforced in a way to forbid protected speech, could survive
constitutional analysis. See generally Kevin Cole & Fred Zacharias, The Agony of
Victory and the Ethics of Lawyer Speech, 47 S.C. L. Rev. (forthcoming 1996) (discuss-
ing the concerns prompted by lawyer speech to the press and the difficulty of writing
rules addressing those concerns).
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artificial limits on their own rulemaking power. 9 Thus they prefer to
emphasize legal constraints on lawyers-the disciplining function of
regulation-in defining ethical rules.100 This tendency is reinforced by
the fact that the district courts themselves may be responsible for en-
forcement. As a result, judges are likely to personalize their focus on
the disciplining aspects of regulation.1 1
Judges also may overemphasize "the image-building" function of
ethics regulation. Judicial implementation of ethics rules takes place
in a very public forum that tends to highlight borderline lawyer con-
duct and courts' failure to deal with it.102 That, perhaps explains the
frequency with which courts cite the "appearance of impropriety" in
their decisions on lawyer disqualification, 0 3 even though that ration-
99. This tendency helps explain not only judicial doctrines of self-restraint, but
also the recent decisions by the Supreme Court that for the first time have limited
federal courts' power to exercise supervisory authority over actors in the legal system.
See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 47 (1992) (limiting judicial authority
over conduct before the grand jury). I already have questioned the DOJ's and Little's
view of the meaning and breadth of these decisions. See supra note 43. However,
such decisions do suggest that courts may voluntarily impose limits on their own au-
thority to guide lawyer conduct when no imperative to forbid or require the conduct
exists.
100. See Zacharias, Specificity in Professional Responsibility Codes, supra note 1, at
249-57 (describing professsional regulation's function of providing clear, enforceable
standards of conduct).
101. Of course, the question of how federal courts should enforce violations of local
rules has never been fully answered. Ordinarily, violations of rules are decided by the
courts themselves in the context of sanction motions by the adversary-for example,
disqualification motions arising because of a conflict of interest-or in the context of
contempt orders. Thus far, the no-contacts issue that gave rise to the Reno rule has
surfaced primarily in cases in which a defendant seeks dismissal of the indictment.
See e.g., United States v. Lopez, 4 F.3d 1455, 1464 (9th Cir. 1993) (vacating order
dismissing indictment where prosecutorial action violated local rule), appeals dock-
eted, No. 95-10366 and No. 95-10394 (filed Aug 18, 1995 and Sept. 1, 1995); United
States v. Hammad, 858 F.2d 834, 842 (2d Cir. 1988) (denying defendant's motion to
supress evidence obtained in violation of discplinary rule), modified, 902 F2d 1062
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 871 (1990).
To the extent discipline of a lawyer is the appropriate sanction and cannot easily be
accomplished through contempt, the federal courts currently have little option but to
refer misconduct to the state bar. In theory, a federal district court might also adopt a
procedure enabling a district to forbid a lawyer from practicing before the district in
the future. Whether the development of a full federal system for judging lawyer mis-
conduct is appropriate remains an open question. See Ted Schneyer, Professional Dis-
cipline in 2050: A Look Back, 60 Fordham L Rev. 125, 127 (1991) (suggesting that
federal enforcement of legal ethics may become the norm); Zacharias, Federalizing
Legal Ethics, supra note 45, at 378, 396-00 (discussing federal enforcement).
102. Bar disciplinary proceedings typically are sealed and conducted under a veil of
confidentiality. In contrast, judicial controls of lawyer conduct take place in open
court, routinely are publicized in bar journals or local legal reports, and sometimes
spawn publicity in the media, particularly when the lawyer conduct arises in highly
publicized cases such as the OJ. Simpson trial.
103. See, e.g., Analytica, Inc. v. NPD Research, Inc., 708 F.2d 1263, 1269 (7th Cir.
1983) (holding that the appearance of impropriety factor has weight in side-switching
cases); Petroleum Wholesale, Inc. v. Marshall, 751 S.W.2d 295, 301 (Tex. Ct App.
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ale for ethics regulation increasingly has been downplayed in scholar-
ship and bar-generated codes. 1' 4
These observations are not meant to suggest that courts can never
be neutral nor that all local district court regulation is driven by judi-
cial self-interest. Indeed, for the most part, local district courts simply
have adopted state ethics regulation as their own. 105 Moreover, when
judges make rules through a centralized body, such as the Federal Ju-
dicial Conference, they act more like a legislature. 10 6 It is mainly
when a local court's attention is drawn to specific provisions and local
judges make their own assessments of the proper policy balance that a
misplaced emphases on some of the goals of ethics regulation may
occur. As a consequence, federal district courts, though technically
independent, may not be the most trustworthy regulators when it
comes to prosecutorial ethics.
4. State and Federal Legislatures as Rulemakers
The above analysis of the alternative regulators of prosecutorial
ethics may seem surprising. When one considers which institutions
are most competent to regulate in this area, one's initial instincts are
to identify the DOJ, the bar, and the courts. After all, these bodies
have the expertise, both with respect to the subject matter of legal
ethics and with respect to the process of making rules.
A legislature, in contrast, might seem a questionable body to write
an ethics code. Legislators tend to have limited legal experience. 10 7
They typically are not considered the best innovators. Original legis-
lation tends to be produced through the clash of competing lobbyists
and other informed sources who provide the legislators with informa-
1988) (ordering disqualification based on appearance of impropriety even where no
actual impropriety occurred).
104. See, e.g., Charles W. Wolfram, Modem Legal Ethics § 7.1.4 (1986) (arguing
that judicial use of appearance of impropriety reasoning creates confusion); Victor H.
Kramer, The Appearance of Impropriety Under Canon 9: A Study of Federal Judicial
Process Applied to Lawyers, 65 Minn. L. Rev. 243, 244 (1981) (arguing that the lead-
ing federal cases relying on Canon 9 reveal inconsistent and vague decisions that leave
attorneys without any reliable guide for their conduct).
105. See Judicial Conference Report, supra note 44, at 4-5 (listing courts that have
adopted state rules); see also supra note 18.
106. In proposing new rules to govern all federal courts, the Judicial Conference
typically acts pursuant to different authority than local courts. See 28 U.S.C. § 2074
(1994) (Rules Enabling Act); 28 U.S.C. § 2071 (1994) (authorizing local court rules).
Under the Rules Enabling Act, the Conference studies issues as a deliberative body.
A committee consisting of representative judges proposes uniform rules. After Con-
ference proposals are adopted by the Supreme Court, they are submitted to Congress,
with time to evaluate and disapprove the new rules as Congress sees fit. 28 U.S.C.
§ 2074.
107. See Zacharias, Federalizing Legal Ethics, supra note 45, at 394-95 (discussing
limited competence of legislators to address specialized legal ethics issues).
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tion and perspective.10 8 Legal ethics issues have never inspired the
variety of lobbying forces necessary for the formulation of new ideas
and alternative proposals."°
Yet these conclusions may be less valid when one considers narrow
areas of ethics regulation such as prosecutorial ethics or, even more
specifically, the area of no-contacts. For limited ethics issues, there
may be the kind of self-interest, lobbying competition, and public con-
cern that can enable a legislature to face the issues;110 in other words,
it is likely that the legislature can be made competent. We already
have seen some signs of that in the area of regulation of prosecutors,
where Congress has begun to show an interest in learning about and
entering the field."'
Would state legislatures or the federal Congress be more "trustwor-
thy" in weighing the different goals of prosecutorial ethics regulation?
If we get to this point in the analysis, we probably have to acknowl-
edge the superiority of Congress. State legislatures will not take full
account of federal concerns in regulating their lawyers.'1 2 Moreover,
insofar as a need for uniformity in the regulation of prosecutors is
important, as the Reno rule suggests, only Congress can devise an ap-
propriate rule." 3 Finally, as a practical matter, since the authority the
DOJ claims for the Reno rule derives from Congress, only Congress is
in a position to override DOJ regulations in a way that avoids the
possibility of a DOJ challenge.
In comparing the competence of federal and state legislatures, it is
again important to note the difference between the U.S. Congress
promulgating a whole code of ethics and Congress addressing narrow
areas. However one feels about federalizing legal ethics, the best ar-
gument against it is that different states may experiment with different
108. Id. at 377, 391 (discussing mechanisms for educating legislators regarding
issues).
109. See id. at 377.
110. Provided, for example, by the ABA, the DOJ, the American Law Institute and
the various prosecutor and defense unions and organizations. The Judicial Confer-
ence of the United States, through its Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure,
has begun to study federal cases involving rules of attorney conduct with a view to
proposing uniform federal rules. See supra note 106. This project, too, may help to
inform Congress, especially in areas where the DOJ claims the right to preempt rules
the Conference may propose.
111. See, ag., Subcomm. on Gov't Information, Justice, Agriculture, House Comm.
on Government Operations, Federal Prosecutorial Authority in a Changing Legal En-
vironment More Attention Required, H.R Rep. No. 986, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 36
(1990) (recommending no immediate congressional action but promising heightened
oversight of federal prosecutorial activities).
112. See Zacharias, Federalizing Legal Ethics, supra note 45, at 382-84 (discussing
difference between state and federal interests in much of professional regulation).
113. See generally 59 Fed. Reg. 39,910, 39,911 (1994) (to be codified at 28 C.F.R.
§ 77) (emphasizing the need for uniformity as the driving force underlying the Reno
rule); Zacharias, Federalizing Legal Ethics, supra note 45, at 345 (discussing possibility
of federalizing professional regulation because of the need for uniformity).
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solutions, thus providing an empirical track record for future regula-
tors to rely upon." 4 As the issues Congress focuses on become nar-
row, as in the no-contacts realm, the argument loses force. State
regulation in this area has already had time to develop; no-contacts
regulation is not new. Moreover, resolution of the issues turns more
on policy choices than data.
There also is something a bit inconsistent about arguing, on the one
hand, that regulation in this narrow area requires uniformity and, on
the other, that state regulation should govern. As I have discussed
elsewhere, to do a proper job of code-drafting, state regulators would
need to address the narrow question of, say, no-contacts, with refer-
ence to the overall purposes of the whole state code."15 The diverse
codes are likely to have diverse purposes. It is therefore of questiona-
ble utility to gauge the success or failure of state "experiments," be-
cause they will have been developed with something other than
uniformity in mind. Again, Congress is perhaps the only body that
can determine how much weight the goal of achieving uniform regula-
tion of federal prosecutors deserves in the overall rulemaking pro-
cess." 6 For all of these reasons, perhaps we should prefer a federal
legislative solution over deference to state codes. 117
B. The Interaction Between the DOJ and the ABA
I have tried to suggest that there are a variety of reasons for and
against relying on each of the potential rulemakers in the area of
prosecutorial ethics. The concerns that one might consider in deciding
Little's question of whether the Attorney General should exercise her
rulemaking power breaks down into two categories. First, which regu-
114. See Duncan T. O'Brien, Multistate Practice and Conflicting Ethical Obliga-
tions, 16 Seton Hall L. Rev. 678, 721 (1986) (noting that diverse processional rules
"can lead to greater debate over and more careful examination of controversial is-
sues"); cf. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that states serve as legislative "laboratories").
115. Zacharias, Specificity in Professional Responsibility Codes, supra note 1, at
305-09 (arguing that code drafters must initially identify goals and subgoals of the
code before attempting to promulgate reforms).
116. It is important to note that, as a policy matter, both the ABA and the DOJ
positions regarding the no-contacts issue have some merit. One therefore could not
fairly conclude that Congress would be "wrong" or acting entirely in a self-interested
way by choosing one position over another. See supra note 72. Legislators might em-
phasize personal political concerns in deciding the issues, but political pressure will be
exerted on them from both sides-through pro-law enforcement lobbyists and lobby-
ists for the private bar (supported by their potential white collar clients). Unlike the
ABA or the DOJ, however, the legislators will not have personal institutional inter-
ests that will be affected by the resolution of the policy choice. They thus will decide
the policy neutrally, by whatever process they use to make policy choices in any
situation.
117. I do not dwell here on the general competence of federal versus state legisla-
tures. Cf. Zacharias, Federalizing Legal Ethics, supra note 45, at 391-96 (discussing
Congress's competence). One's view of relative competence may, of course, influence
one's view of who should decide the substantive issues.
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lator can society most trust to choose among the various possible func-
tions of professional regulation? Second, which regulator is most
competent to do so?
How one comes out on those questions may depend on whether one
is considering wholesale regulation of prosecutorial ethics, in general,
or regulation in narrow areas, such as contacts with represented per-
sons or grand jury subpoenas directed to attorneys. In David Wil-
kins's terms, it depends on context here too.
The history of the Reno rule has been tortuous. The core dispute
between the DOJ and the ABA became heated when the ABA sought
to regulate specific prosecutorial behavior on two fronts, by enacting a
rule limiting prosecutorial subpoenas ordering attorneys to appear
before grand juries 18 and by reinterpreting the preexisting no-con-
tacts rule to apply to preindictment undercover activity. 119 The Bush
administration DOJ, seeing its institutional interests threatened, is-
sued a policy memorandum challenging ABA and state regulators' au-
thority to implement these rules.12° Attorney General Reno built on
the previous administration's policy by promulgating the Reno rule.'
Interestingly, academics and other neutral observers have excori-
ated the behavior of both the ABA and the DOJ.122 That response
probably reflects the sense of the above analysis that both institutions
were acting in a self-interested fashion. Where the no-contacts and
grand jury subpoena rules apply, they shape (or at least significantly
affect) the balance of power between the prosecution and the defense
bar."2 Inevitably, the DOJ (the prosecution's regulatory representa-
tive) and the ABA (the defense bar's regulatory representative) will
118. Model Rules, supra note 11, Rule 3.8(f) (1991) (amended 1995); see generally
Zacharias, Subpoenas of Attorneys, supra note 11 (discussing rule and citing
authorities).
119. See ABA Standing Comm. on Ethics and Proffessional Responsibility, Formal
Op. 95-396 (1995) [hereinafter Formal Op. 396] (forbidding prosecutorial contacts
with a represented person even at the preindictment stage). The Standing Committee
opinion was the culmination of building support for this position that first drew
strength from the Second Circuit's decision in United States v. Hammad, 858 F.2d 834(2d Cir. 1988), modified, 902 F.2d 1062 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 871 (1990), and
then coalesced in opposition to the Thornburgh Memorandum.
120. See Thornburgh Memorandum, supra note 1.
121. See supra note 1 for a more detailed history of the Reno rule.
122. See, eg., Green, Whose Rules?, supra note 9 (questioning the DOJ's "con-
frontational attitude" with respect to 4.2); Cramton & Udell, supra note 7 (criticizing
the bar's position on Model Rules 3.8(f) and 4.2); Moore, supra note 84 (criticizing
warfare between the DOJ and the ABA regarding 3.8(f) and 4.2); Zacharias, Subpoe-
nas of Attorneys, supra note 11 (criticizing Bar's unilateral position in 3.8(f));
Zacharias, Specificity in Professional Responsibility Codes, supra note 1 (questioning
both sides' one-sided positions with respect to 3.8(f)).
123. The subpoena rule allows the prosecutor to require a defense attorney to tes-
tify in secret, thus potentially driving a wedge between counsel and client or ulti-
mately requiring the lawyer's withdrawal from the case. See Zacharias, Subpoenas of
Attorneys, supra note 11, at 942-43 (citing authorities). The no-contacts rule, carried
to its extreme, may prevent a prosecutor or federal agents acting under his direction
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emphasize personal concerns of its constituents, to the detriment of
other regulatory functions. That probably means that neither the
DOJ nor the ABA is an appropriate institution to decide the sub-
stance of regulation in the area of prosecutorial ethics.
Professor Little and I are in agreement that the best solution would
be for all interested parties to reach a mutually satisfactory conclu-
sion, through a neutral drafting process that takes everyone's interests
into account.12 4 Where we seem to part company, however, is in how
that result can best be achieved.
One might conclude, as Little does, that the DOJ's partiality means
that the DOJ should forgo implementing the regulatory authority as-
serted in the Reno rule. But when one reflects on the history of the
no-contacts and grand jury subpoena debates, one can justify the op-
posite conclusion. What we have seen in these areas is a slow political
process which, in effect, works either towards eliminating the biases in
the DOJ's and the ABA's alternative proposals or towards inviting
the intervention of Congress (or, in Little's terms, some other "blue
ribbon" decisionmaker).125 As I have suggested above, Congress may
be the body most capable of providing useful uniform rules regulating
prosecutorial conduct.'2 6 Congress may be the only body that can
seek, successfully or unsuccessfully, to evaluate neutrally the societal
implications of the competing approaches.' 7
Consider, for example, Model Rule 3.8(f), the grand jury subpoena
rule. 28 As I, and others, have written, the original ABA provision
was a bald attempt to create an advantage for criminal defendants and
criminal defense lawyers unrelated to the "ethics" policy concerns that
purportedly drove the rule. Rather than tailor the rule towards pro-
tecting legitimate expectations in attorney-client relationships, the
from speaking with witnesses or potential defendants (undercover or openly) if the
person is represented in this or any other matter. Formal Op. 396, supra note 119.
124. Little, supra note 5, at 424-25.
125. Id at 414.
126. See supra notes 110-17 and accompanying text.
127. See supra note 116. The only other realistic possibility may be the semi-legisla-
tive Judicial Conference, which has already begun looking at the issues with input
from the DOJ and others.
128. Model Rules, supra note 11, Rule 3.8(0 (1990), as enacted and before it was
modified in 1995, provided in pertinent part:
[A prosecutor shall] not subpoena a lawyer in a grand jury or other criminal pro-
ceeding... unless:
(1) the prosecutor reasonably believes:
(i) the information sought is not protected from disclosure by any applicable
privilege;
(ii) the evidence sought is essential to the successful completion of an ongoing in-
vestigation or prosecution;
(iii) there is no other feasible alternative to obtain the information; and
(2) the prosecutor obtains prior judicial approval after an opportunity for an adver-
sarial proceeding.
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ABA sought to insulate unprivileged information from discovery and
to protect defense lawyers from having to withdraw from cases.129
In contrast, the bar originally interpreted the ABA's no-contacts
provision with significant respect for law enforcement needs.' 30 Judi-
cial decisions supported the prevailing view that professional no-con-
tacts rules did not apply to preindictment law enforcement
activities.' 31 As soon as the decision in United States v. Hammad'
32
gave the defense bar some hope of expanding the provision's reach,1 33
however, the ABA reinterpreted the provision.13 The result was the
broadest possible rule forbidding all undercover investigation under
prosecutorial supervision when a target has counsel.
The DOJ fought both the subpoena and no-contacts rules on the
ABA floor.135 The DOJ was outnumbered by the defense bar.131 In
essence, it had no way of influencing the outcome.
In response, the DOJ preempted both rules through the Thorn-
burgh Memorandum. Now the situation had reversed itself 180 de-
grees. This time the defense bar had no influence.1
37
Both unilateral exercises of power left one side unsatisfied. The
losers had only two kinds of recourse. They could appeal to the courts,
which would decide legal issues rather than the substance of what
should constitute professional misconduct.'3 Alternatively, they
could appeal to Congress.
129. Zacharias, Subpoenas of Attorneys, supra note 11, at 941-51 (offering an alter-
native rule more tailored to the bar's legitimate concerns).
130. See Samuel Dash, Justice Department Contacts with Represented Persons: An
Alarming Assertion of Power, 78 Judicature 137, 137-38 (1994) (describing original
position of the bar on prosecutorial contacts with represented persons).
131. E.g., United States v. Kenny, 645 F.2d 1323, 1339 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 452
U.S. 920 (1981); see also authorities cited in Saylor & Wilson, supra note 7, at 465-71
(discussing split among courts as to whether the "ethical prohibition against commu-
nications with represented parties... [should] apply in criminal cases").
132. 846 F.2d 854 (2d Cir. 1988), modified, 858 F.2d 834. remodified, 902 F.2d 1062
(2d Cir. 1988), cert denied, 498 U.S. 871 (1990).
133. Id. at 857.
134. Formal Op. 396, supra note 119.
135. See, e.g., Burke, supra note 2, at 1648-49 (describing the debate over 42 and its
scope); Cramton & Udell, supra note 7, at 319-21 (same); Moore, supra note 84, at
519- 22, 530-32 (describing the debate over Model Rule 4.2 and 3.8(f)).
136. See Saylor & Wilson, supra note 7, at 461 n.2 (providing statistics on ABA
membership).
137. The process leading to the adoption of the Reno rule provided at least two
opportunities for comment. Initially, the Clinton administration made some initial
changes softening the breadth of the exceptions to the no-contacts provisions. There-
after, however, the DOJ's basic proposal was adopted essentially unchanged despite
hostile comments and a critical report by a conference of state judges. The DOJ ex-
plained its rejection of the comments but, for the most part, did not attempt to recon-
cile them. See 59 Fed. Reg. 39,910, 39,913-18 (1994) (to be codified at 28 CF.R § 77)
(discussing comments received).
138. The legal issues include: whether Congress delegated the DOJ authority to
preempt state and federal court professional rules; whether the Supremacy Clause of
the Constitution empowers the DOJ, or even Congress, to preempt state codes;
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In the big war over prosecutorial ethics in general, members of
Congress proposed a bill that specifically would have authorized the
DOJ to preempt all state ethics rules relating to federal prosecu-
tors.139 The full Congress thus far has demurred, presumably because
Congress feels ill-suited or unprepared to address the entire field of
prosecutorial ethics.140 But Congress remains in the picture, having
warned the DOJ in a recent report that it will be watching the DOJ
position closely. 14 1
But the narrower battles over the no-contacts and grand jury sub-
poena issues have continued. As often happens with respect to fo-
cused legal disputes, courts and academics have addressed the issues
and, arguably, changed the nature of the debates. The cases and aca-
demic writing have drawn attention to values and approaches that the
unilateral decisionmaking processes of the ABA and the DOJ failed
to consider. 42 Concomitantly, the continued stand-off has fueled me-
dia attention to the issues.
Two results were possible. First, the ABA and the DOJ had the
option of discussing the subjects more dispassionately. That, indeed,
is what has occurred with respect to Model Rule 3.8(f). The ABA
redrafted the rule, to ease the impact upon law enforcement.'43
Problems for the DOJ remain, for some state provisions continue to
whether separation of powers concerns foreclose DOJ preemption of district court
rules; and whether the DOJ fully satisfied all administrative requirements in adopting
its regulation.
139. S.3, The Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Improvement Act of
1995, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 502 (1995), proposed: "Notwithstanding the ethical
rules or the rules of the court of any State, Federal rules of conduct adopted by the
Attorney General shall govern the conduct of prosecutions in the courts of the United
States."
140. See Zacharias, Federalizing Legal Ethics, supra note 45, at 387-96 (discussing
congressional competence, or lack thereof, to address legal ethics issues). There is an
alternative explanation for Congress's conduct; namely, that it approves of the DOJ's
adoption of the Reno rule in principle and merely is awaiting developments before
deciding whether to act further on its own. Although plausible, this interpretation
seems less likely in light of Congress's failure to mention it in the course of deciding
not to act on the proposed bill.
141. Subcomm. on Gov't Info., Justice, Agriculture, House Comm. on Gov't Oper-
ations, Federal Prosecutorial Authority in a Changing Legal Environment: More At-
tention Required, H.R. Rep. No. 986, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. at 36 (1990).
142. See, e.g., Cramton & Udell, supra note 7, at 311-15, 333-57, 371-85 (discussing
undervalued prosecutorial interests with respect to no-contacts and grand jury sub-
poena rules); Green, Whose Rules?, supra note 9 (discussing subjectivity of the DOJ
regulation of contacts with represented persons); Zacharias, Subpoenas of Attorneys,
supra note 11, at 944-51 (identifying alternative reforms to address concerns underly-
ing grand jury subpoena rule).
143. The current Model Rule 3.8(f) deletes the part of the original rule requiring
prosecutors to obtain "prior judicial approval [for the issuance of a subpoena] after an
opportunity for an adversarial proceeding." Model Rules, supra note 11, Rule 3.8(0
(1995).
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follow the original ABA approach.1"' But the Attorney General has
responded to the ABA overture with corresponding restraint; notably
absent in the Reno rule is any mention of the grand jury subpoena
regulations. The DOJ seems prepared to work out the remaining dis-
putes on a case-by-case basis 45 or in nonconfrontational fora.146
The second possibility was for the warring institutions to stick to
their guns, as in the no-contacts area. Courts ultimately may resolve
the dispute indirectly, by resolving legal issues that allow or forbid
certain kinds of substantive regulation. But what also inevitably hap-
pens as a result of a showdown is that media attention builds. 47
Often, such publicity encourages legislators to become involved. The
academic and judicial analyses of the issues that are produced in the
interim help give Congress an informational foundation to use in
resolving the issues.
My view of the history of the no-contacts debate is that we are in
the midst of this second process. The DOJ has reacted to the ABA's
one-sided position with an equally one-sided response. The two insti-
tutions will work the hard issues out. Or they will not, in which case
Congress should-and I predict will-intervene.'1 Little's article,
and others, will help Congress analyze the issues.
C. How Will Regulation of Prosecutorial Ethics Develop?
What of the broader question of whether the DOJ can preempt all
state ethics regulation? The courts continue to dance around the legal
questions, often reaching inconsistent conclusions. 4 9 In the interim,
144. Of course, some states may refuse to adopt the ABA revision or federal dis-
trict courts may adopt their own rules. See generally Mullenix, supra note 44, at 126
(discussing disparity in local rules). However, problems may arise even where states
do accept the compromise. For example, suppose a federal district court adopted a
state code modelled after the old version of Model Rule 3.8(f) and this rule is chal-
lenged. Suppose further that the state subsequently adopts the ABA's redrafted pro-
vision. Because the original rule governs in federal court, a challenge to it must
address the preemption, separation of powers, and perhaps even the supremacy
clause issues, even though the state has accepted the compromise position.
145. See, e.g., Whitehouse v. United States Dist. Court, 53 F.3d 1349, 1365-66 (1st
Cir. 1995) (granting the DOJ appeal in part, by upholding federal district court's
adoption of state anti-subpoena rule with respect to trial subpoenas but not grand jury
subpoenas).
146. Reportedly, the DOJ has representatives working with the Federal Judicial
Conference in its exploration of possible semi-legislative solution to the disuniformity
of professional regulation in the federal courts. See supra notes 101, 106.
147. See, e.g., Zacharias, Specificity in Professional Responsibility Codes, supra note
1, at 255-56 n.100, 290 nn. 207-08 (illustrating the response to Model Rule 3.8(f)).
148. In recent months, the ABA has begun to focus on the issue of congressional
oversight of federal prosecutorial activity. At its 1996 Annual Meeting, the ABA ap-
proved a "policy resolution" purporting to state principles governing congressional
oversight and prosecutors' cooperation with congressional committees. 59 Crim. L
Rep. (BNA) 1441, 1442-43 (Aug. 14, 1996).
149. See the conflicting authorities cited supra notes 6, 64. It is significant to note
that the courts have decided many of the cases thus far on grounds other than the
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the Attorney General's conduct has been striking. Although she as-
serts the power to preempt, in practice she has chosen not to exercise
that power except with respect to the no-contacts issue.
Professor Little says the Attorney General should not exercise that
power. I suggest that, as a practical matter, she will not exercise it,
unless driven to taking that step by some new one-sided threat by the
bar. But if such a threat should develop, my view is that the Attorney
General perhaps should respond by exercising her authority-not be-
cause Little is wrong in his cost-benefit analysis, but because that re-
sponse would create more of a political equilibrium. It may be the
only process by which Congress, the most suitable decision maker
under my analysis, can be forced to intervene.
CONCLUSION
This Response does not purport to be the final word, either on the
legal questions regarding preemption nor on its somewhat fanciful as-
sessment of the political process in which the Reno plays a role. The
Response simply attempts to challenge our thinking that the tradi-
tional methods of ethics regulation are the only options. I have tried
to suggest that Professor Little's two-dimensional way of looking at
the no-contacts issue-who should we prefer, the DOJ or the tradi-
tional regulators-may be somewhat too narrow.
The increasing politicization150 and legalization' 5 ' of professional
code drafting suggests that, over time, more of the potential regulators
are likely to get involved. David Wilkins's article' 52 and my earlier
piece' 53 have suggested that this trend already has begun and may be
a good thing.' 54 If, as Professor Wilkins argues, we analyze profes-
federal government's power, or lack of power, to preempt state and federal district
court rules. See, e.g., United States v. Ferrara, 54 F.3d 825, 832-33 (D.C. Cir. 1995)
(holding that the Thornburgh Memorandum did not constitute preemptive federal
"law" and finding lack of personal jurisdiction); United States v. Ryans, 903 F.2d 731,
739 (10th Cir.) (interpreting no-contacts rule as not applying to investigative stages),
cert. denied, 498 U.S. 855 (1990); United States v. Hammad, 858 F.2d 834, 839 (2d Cir.
1988) (relying upon local rule's "authorized by law" exception), modified, 902 F.2d
1062 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 871 (1990).
150. See, e.g., Schneyer, Professionalism, supra note 84, at 688-724 (describing the
political process through which the Model Rules were adopted).
151. See generally Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., The Future of Legal Ethics, 100 Yale L.J.
1239 (1991) (arguing that professional regulation has become equivalent to legislation
in its form and substance and in the process of its formulation and adoption).
152. Wilkins, supra note 76.
153. Zacharias, Specificity in Professional Responsibility Codes, supra note 1.
154. The DOJ is but one example of a relatively new "regulator" of legal ethics that
has entered the field. The Office of Thrift Supervision and other federal agencies that
have seized upon OTS's conduct in the Kaye, Scholer case are other examples. See
Zacharias, Federalizing Legal Ethics, supra note 45, at 368-70 (discussing federal agen-
cies that have adopted OTS-like positions). In this symposium, Anthony Davis and
Charles Silver have suggested that malpractice insurers also Will play an increasing
role in regulating attorney conduct. Anthony E. Davis, Professional Liability Insurers
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sional regulation closely-"in context,"-we may find resolving the
substance of ethics issues more difficult than ever before. If, as I sug-
gest, we consider the functions of professional regulation and the com-
petence and trustworthiness of alternative regulators, the issues
become even more complex. Recognizing the intricacy of the task
may, in the long run, be the first step towards completing it in a better
way.
As Regulators of Law Practice, 65 Fordham L. Rev. 209 (1996) (predicting increasing
role for insurers in channelling lawyer behavior); Charles Silver, Professional Liability
Insurance As Insurance and As Lawyer Regulations: Response to Davis, 65 Fordhan
L. Rev. 233 (1996) (explaining mechanisms by which insurers affect lawyer behavior);
see also Charles Silver & Kent Syverud, The Professional Responsibilities of Insurance
Defense Lawyers, 45 Duke LJ. 255 (1995) (discussing the tripartite relationship and
controls on insurance defense lawyers).
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